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SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND JURISDICTION 
A. Summary of Proceedings, The appellants (Little 
America Hotel and Hotel Utah), together with a coalition of 
other innkeepers filed a lawsuit in the Third District Court 
challenging a City revenue license tax. 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson of the Third District Court 
granted partial summary judgment on the per se validity of 
the ordinance and the enabling power issues; however, the 
lower court reserved the "as applied" validity questions for 
further factual development. Following admissions of the 
appellant-Hotels that they had no facts to demonstrate the 
ordinance was discriminatorily applied, the lower court 
granted Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Two of the innkeepers, Little America Hotel Corporation 
and the Hotel Utah Company, have appealed that decision. 
B. Jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction in the Utah Supreme Court is asserted as 
an appeal from a final civil judgment, pursuant to the 
provisions of Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah 
Constitution and Section 78-2-2(3) Utah Code Ann., 1953, as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented by this appeal: 
1. Are municipal taxing ordinances and their 
classifications of taxpayers entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality? 
2. Does Salt Lake City have enabling power to impose a 
gross receipts based business revenue tax? 
3. Does the record legally justify the separate tax 
classification of the approximately 100 innkeepers within 
the City? 
4. Did the lower court err in granting a discovery 
protective order (insulating Utah Power and Light Company 
from a burdensome production of franchise tax payments made 
by innkeeper-competitors of the appellant-Hotels) where 
appellants avowed use was to compute the total of all taxes 
paid by the class of innkeepers and compare that number with 
appellantsf estimated value of governmental services 
received? 
5. Does a corporate taxpayer have a legal right to 
challenge a taxing classification on the basis of comparing 
the amount of total taxes paid with the cost of benefits 
received, absent claims of confiscatory taxation or that the 
tax rate was wholly arbitrary or capricious as being beyond 
the revenue needs of the City? 
6. Is the City's business revenue license tax an 
illegal "sales" or "income" tax where: (a) the tax is 
imposed on the business for the privilege of doing business 
in the City and not assessed to the consumer based on the 
value of services received; and (b) there is no formula to 
deduct expenses or otherwise tax "net" income on a graduated 
basis? 
7. Does discretionary enabling power granted to Salt 
Lake County to the tax hotels for tourist promotion under 
Chapter 31, Title 17 U.C.A. preempt the statutory enabling 
power of Salt Lake City to reasonably classify and tax 
businesses in the City, under Sections 10-8-39 and 80 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL/STATUTORY 
ORDINANCE PROVISIONS 
1. 10-8-39 Utah Code Ann,, 1953. See Appendix "10". 
2. 10-8-80 Utah Code Ann., 1953: 
10-8-80. License fees and taxes. 
They may raise revenue by levying and 
collecting a license fee or tax on any 
business within the limits of the city, 
and regulate the same by ordinance; 
provided, that no Utah city or town 
shall collect a license fee or tax 
hereunder from any solicitor or salesman 
who solicits, obtains orders for or 
sells goods in such city or town solely 
for resale; and no enumeration of powers 
of cities contained in this chapter, 
shall be deemed to limit or restrict the 
general grant of authority hereby 
conferred. All such license fees and 
taxes shall be uniform in respect to the 
class upon which they are imposed. 
3. Chapter 3, Title 20 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, 1965 as amended. See Appendix "8". 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Salt Lake City adopted Bill No. 40 of 1982 imposing a 
one percent business occupation or privilege tax on the 
classification of innkeepers who provide rooms to persons 
for 30 days or less. Three groups of innkeepers challenged 
the tax on numerous constitutional, statutory and common-law 
grounds. The appellant-Hotels seek a declaratory judgment 
voiding the ordinance and approximately $571,000 in taxes 
paid to the date of the Summary Judgment. If the ordinance 
is invalidated, it would prospectively have a revenue impact 
on the City of approximately $550,000 per annum. 
Following extensive discovery (the record totals over 
1300 pages), cross motions for summary judgment were filed 
by the appellants and the other innkeepers, who chose not to 
appeal. The lower court reviewed in depth this record and, 
after nine months of deliberation, granted a partial summary 
judgment to Salt Lake, upholding the per se validity and 
constitutionality of the ordinance; it reserved for factual 
determination whether or not the tax was being applied in a 
discriminatory or unconstitutional manner. 
Later, appellants admitted they had no facts on the 
remaining issue of the case, and following additional 
briefing, Judge Timothy R. Hanson granted Salt Lake City a 
complete Summary Judgment of dismissal, with prejudice. 
B. Facts. 
The undisputed facts, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the losing party below, but considering the 
relevant presumptions and burdens of proof, demonstrate the 
following: 
1. Salt Lake City is a municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah. It is the seat of Utah government and the 
State's only first class city. (Article XIX, Section 3 Utah 
Constitution; 10-2-301 Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended). 
2. Effective July 1, 1982, Salt Lake City adopted a 
Business Occupation Revenue Tax. This privilege or 
occupation tax is imposed on innkeepers, located within the 
corporate limits of the City; it totals a maximum of 1% of 
gross receipts from the rental of rooms to guests staying 30 
days or less, with a minimum base charge. (Affidavit of 
Ruth Dyer; Bill 40 of 1982, R-211). 
3. Should the tax assessments not be paid by the 
licensee, the privilege for doing business will be revoked. 
It is illegal to operate a business within Salt Lake City, 
without a Business Revenue License. (20-3-3 Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1965, as amended; Affidavit of 
Ruth Dyer, R-211). 
4. Salt Lake City is regional, national and, in some 
instances, an international recreation, religions, 
governmental, commercial, education and medical center. 
These functions draw large numbers of visitors annually to 
the City and create a market for services provided by 
innkeepers doing business within the City. (Affidavit of 
Craig Peterson, R-202). 
5. Salt Lake has expended substantial public resources 
(including lending its credit for industrial revenue bonds) 
to maintain a business climate favorable to the appellant-
hotel and innkeeper businesses. Among others, these efforts 
have included financing development of the Crossroads 
Shopping Mall, including the Marriott Hotel; expansion of 
the Salt Palace; expanding hospital capacity; and financing 
expansion of industrial parks, including the one served by 
the Hilton Hotel operated by the lower court plaintiff, 
Pearson Enterprises. (Affidavits of Lance Bateman and Craig 
Peterson, R-195, 202, 233). 
6. The City maintains and operates the Salt Lake City 
International Airport and has issued general obligation 
bonds to support its development. As of the filing date of 
this suit, it had recently completed a five year, 
$80,000,000, expansion project which uniquely benefits the 
suppliers of transient rooms by encouraging and permitting 
travel of visitors to and from the City. (Affidavit of 
Louis Miller, R-189). 
7. The City has a declining resident population, which 
has decreased approximately 13,000 persons within the last 
ten years prior to the ordinance adoption. However, the 
cost of government has substantially increased. This 
increase is due to many factors including inflation, but is 
also due to expanded commercial and visitor service demands. 
It was the specific intent and purpose of the City Council 
in passing the innkeeper tax, to ease the increasing tax 
burden on the resident population and more equitably share 
the cost of providing municipal services to include the 
innkeepers whose patrons increase the cost of City 
government. (Affidavit of Sydney Fonnesbeck, R-207). 
8. There are high expenses in providing municipal 
services to the central business district, specifically 
including hotels and motels catering to transient guests and 
visitors. (Affidavit of Chiefs Willoughby and Pederson, R-
195, 199). 
9. The suppliers of accommodations for transient 
guests are a distinct and separate class. This distinction 
is recognized by themselves in forming a trade association 
separate from the renters of residential property for 
permanent residency. Further, the taxed class of 
innkeepers' accommodations include a full range of services, 
such as: maid, eating, and room service; valet service; and 
other conveniences to accommodate persons who are away from 
the amenities of their permanent abode. 
The rental rate structure is substantially higher for 
these innkeepers from those businesses providing permanent 
housing. Further, they engage in marketing activities to 
recruit business and recreation travelers seeking 
entertainment, business or convention services in the City. 
In addition, their guests are away from their permanent 
connections to medical, recreation and other contacts. 
Thus, the numbers of patrons, rates of turnover, and demand 
for City services distinguish the taxed class of innkeepers 
from other businesses. (Affidavit of Robert F. Babcock, R-
229). 
10. For the City's 1982-83 fiscal year $67,502,000 
general fund budget, the 1% tax was estimated to generate 
approximately $550,000 from the approximately 100 innkeepers 
in the City. This sum constitutes approximately eight-
tenths of one percent (0.8%)) of the City's general fund 
budget. (Affidavit of Lance Bateman, R-233). 
11. Salt Lake City is the seat of State government; a 
local center for federal governmental agencies; the 
headquarters for the LDS Church, plus many other religious 
organizations; the seat of County government; and the 
headquarters for many education, eleemosynary, health 
service and other tax exempt organizations. As a result, 
approximately 25% of its property for the fiscal year 1982-
83 was property tax exempt. This fact resulted in a loss of 
property tax revenue totaling approximately $4,737,000 per 
year. The innkeepers, including appellants, are direct 
beneficiaries of the business and services needed by such 
organizations in providing care and hotel accommodations to 
their guests and invitees. (Affidavits of Milton Yorgason 
and Lance Bateman, R-192, 233). 
12. None of the innkeeper plaintiffs, including the 
appellant hotels, have even alleged that they would be 
driven out of business by the imposition of the tax. (See 
entire record). 
13. Although appellant-Little America asserts it 
provides enhanced security, garbage and maintenance services 
for itself (appellants1 facts Nos. 5, 6 and 7), it is not a 
separate enclave. All City services available to any 
business in the City are provided to every one of the taxed 
class of innkeepers. There are no facts in the record and 
no allegation in the pleadings asserting that any innkeeper 
in Salt Lake does not receive full City services, including 
police protection; fire protection; paramedic service; 
adjacent street maintenance and snow removal. 
14. After over 9 months of deliberation, the lower 
court granted a Partial Summary Judgment in favor of 
respondent, Salt Lake City, reserving one issue for trial. 
That issue is whether the classification for taxation was 
"arbitrary and/or discriminatory". (The lower courtfs 
Memorandum Decision and Partial Summary dated January 16, 
1984, R-913, 924 are attached as Appendix "1" and "2)". 
15. Disagreements over the meaning of the partial 
summary judgment caused the lower court to request 
additional briefing and argument; thereafter, the court 
clarified its intent and quashed two subpoena duces tecums 
directed against Utah Power and Light Company because they 
merely sought to impose unreasonable burdens on non-parties 
and sought irrelevant information on a rejected theory that 
tax payments create a right to an equivalent value of 
gQvernmental services. (See, Memorandum Decision dated May 
28, 1984, R-1135 attached as Appendix "3"). The lower court 
order stated: 
The scope and intent of the previous Partial 
Summary Judgment was to dismiss all claims, 
assertions, and legal theories advanced by 
Plaintiff [LAHCO], as a matter of law, 
excepting only the issue of whether the tax 
classification selected by Salt Lake City 
Corporation was arbitrary; that is, the 
legislative decision for classification 
lacked a rational basis and/or whether the 
tax was discriminatory as applied within the 
defined tax classification of the ordinance. 
The matter left for trial or further 
proceeding on the within case does not 
include a comparison of the public service 
benefits received by the Plaintiff [LAHCO] 
from the City in relation to taxes paid by 
it. (Emphasis added), (Order Clarifying 
Partial Summary Judgment and Granting 
Protective Order, R-1141, 1142 attached as 
Appendix "4"). 
16. The appellant hotels admitted that they had no 
information on the remaining issue, as defined by the lower 
court and Motions for Summary Judgment were filed with 
additional briefing on 10 consolidated cases. (R-1208, 
1216, 1233 and Stipulation and Order of Consolidation, R-
1292). The lower court heard the arguments, took the matter 
under advisement and issued its Minute Entry decision. (R-
1291) attached as Appendix "6"). It granted the final 
Summary Judgment in favor of respondent Salt Lake City and 
Mayor Ted L. Wilson on July 7, 1987. (R-1296, attached as 
Appendix "7"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1e Municipal ordinance tax classifications are 
presumptively valid. 
Like state statutes, municipal taxing ordinances are 
presumptively valid and constitutional. In deference to the 
elected legislative bodyfs responsibilities to the 
electorate to create a fair and balanced tax system and in 
respect for the separation-of-powers principle, Courts will 
indulge in every reasonable construction to render a tax 
classification valid; that is, if there exists any rational 
basis for a distinction, the class will be approved. 
The challenger has the burden to establish, by 
admissible evidence, that there is no rational basis for the 
classification and must negate every conceivable basis that 
might support it, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
These concepts are not in conflict with those asserted 
by the appellant-hotels; that is: enabling power or 
authority to tax is never inferred and ambiguities in tax 
laws will be construed in favor of the taxpayer. However, 
these legal principles are not applicable to the 
constitutional challenges advanced by appellants; therefore, 
the authority cited is irrelevant. 
2. The City has enabling power to impose a business 
revenue license tax on reasonably classed businesses. 
Sections 10-8-39 and 80 of the Utah Code specifically 
authorizes cities to classify business and tax them solely 
to raise general fund revenue. 
Appellant-hotels' case law challenging this authority 
either does not stand for the proposition asserted or is 
distinguishable. 
3. There exist rational distinctions to justify 
separate classification of innkeepers as a taxing class. 
Uncontroverted facts demonstrate many reasons for 
distinguishing transient room providers (innkeepers) as a 
separate tax classification. These distinctions include: 
(a) the desire to equitably spread tax burdens to include 
others than property taxpayers living in the City; (b) the 
benefits uniquely provided to these businesses by the City; 
(c) additional service costs generated by the transient 
visitor patrons of the tax innkeepers; and (d) the unique 
clientele and methods of doing business of innkeepers. 
In a frequently litigated area, virtually every 
jurisdiction considering the identical or similar challenges 
to taxing innkeepers have approved identical 
classifications. In fact, this same class was approved by 
this Court in 1966. 
The tax classification is rationally based and the 
lower court properly so ruled. 
4. A general fund revenue license tax is not limited 
in amount to the cost of providing governmental service. 
There is a long recognized distinction between a 
regulatory or service fee charges and a general fund revenue 
tax. Regulatory and service charges are limited to the cost 
of regulation or service; however, general fund revenue 
taxes are not so limited. Appellants have incorrectly cited 
"regulatory" cases as authority for an argument against a 
"revenue" taxing ordinance. 
Courts give great deference to tax rate decisions of 
legislative bodies, which are answerable to the electorate. 
Only when tax rates are wholly arbitrary will they be 
judicially set aside. To be judicially overturned, they 
must be so confiscatory as to destroy, not just a single 
taxpayer, but a whole class or be demonstrably beyond the 
needs of the taxing jurisdiction. 
Also, revenue taxes are not an "assessment of 
benefits." It is irrelevant to an evaluation of a taxing 
ordinance that the amount payed by a taxed class is less 
than the services provided by the taxing jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the lower court properly quashed otherwise 
oppressive discovery directed against Utah Power and Light 
Company seeking tax information. 
Similarly, the opinions about the cost of services 
received against taxes paid advanced by appellants' in the 
Affidavit from Mr. Norman are irrelevant because they also 
go to an "assessment of benefits theory," which does not 
state a cause of action, as a matter of law. 
Since there exists no facts to demonstrate confiscatory 
or wholly arbitrary taxation, beyond the needs of the City, 
the tax must be affirmed. 
5. The City revenue tax on innkeepers is imposed as a 
privilege or occupation tax and is not an illegal "sales" or 
"income" tax. 
A "sales" tax is characterized by several incidents, 
including the predominating feature that the tax is imposed 
on the "transaction" and levied against the consumer. An 
"income" tax is distinguished as a tax against an income 
producing entity or person, where the tax is based on "net" 
income. It is often assessed on progressive rates, for tax 
and social policy reasons. 
By contrast, occupation or privilege taxes are revenue 
producing taxes imposed by local jurisdictions for the 
privilege of doing business in that community. The fact 
that a revenue license tax is computed as a percentage of 
the gross receipts of a business does not render it a 
"sales" or "income" tax. Rather, that method of computation 
is simply a fair method selected by the local legislature to 
measure benefits to the business and to set equitable rates. 
It will not be disturbed by the Courts, unless wholly 
arbitrary or confiscatory. 
Virtually every other jurisdiction considering the 
challenge made by appellants to such license taxes have been 
rejected. This Court should similarly uphold the decision 
by the lower court. 
6. The City taxing ordinance has not been preempted by 
discretionary state enabling power given to counties to tax 
the same class of innkeepers for tourist promotion. 
Preemption exists where the state has expressly 
prohibited local governmental intrusion into an area or (by 
implied preemption) when it has so comprehensively regulated 
an area that its intent to exclude local governmental action 
is inferred by the Courts. Chapter 31 of Title 17 of the 
Utah Code does neither. 
The legislation, in fact, does not even deal with the 
state or produce revenue for it; rather, it is simply 
discretionary enabling power for a county to tax hotels and 
motels to raise money for tourist promotion. It has no more 
dignity or precursive effect than the grant of power to 
cities to tax and regulate the same class of businesses 
found in Section 10-8-39, 80 Utah Code Ann., 1953. 
There is no prohibition against separate jurisdiction 
imposing taxes on the same class of taxpayers. Therefore, 
in the absence of facts demonstrating that the City tax 
operates to substantially interfere with the functioning of 
a state statute or undermine it purpose, this challenge must 
fail. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES ARE ENTITLED TO A 
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND 
CONSTITUTIONALITY. EVERY REASONABLE 
CONSTRUCTION WILL BE UTILIZED TO RENDER 
AN ORDINANCE AND ITS CLASSIFICATIONS 
VALID. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE 
CHALLENGER TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THE INVALIDITY OF AN ORDINANCE. 
Municipal ordinances, like state statutes, are 
presumptively valid. Courts will indulge in every 
reasonable construction to render the legislative act valid 
and constitutional. Professor McQuillin, in his respected 
treatise on municipal corporations, has stated: 
No ordinance or law will be declared 
unconstitutional unless clearly so, and every 
reasonable [effort] will be made to sustain 
it. Not only must unconstitutionality appear 
clear, but, it has been asserted, it must 
appear and be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt . . . If the constitutional questions 
raised are fairly debatable, the court must 
declare the ordinance constitutional, as the 
court cannot and must not substitute its 
judgment for that of the local legislative 
body. 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 
Section 19.06 at pp. 377-78 (3rd Ed.Rev.); 
see also, _Id. Section 19.14. 
This Court has adopted this rule of construction. It held: 
It [a city ordinance] should not be held to 
be invalid unless it is shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be incompatible with some 
particular constitutional provision. Salt 
Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037 
(Utah, 1975), cert. den. 425 U.S. 915, 47 
L.Ed.2d 766 (authorities omitted, emphasis 
added). 
In no other area is this presumptive validity of 
statutes and ordinances applied more stringently than in the 
area of classification for tax purposes. New York Rapid 
Transportation Corp. v. New York City, 303 U.S. 573, 578, 58 
S.Ct. 721, 82 L.Ed. 1024, 1030 (1939); Menlove v. Salt Lake 
County, 18 Utah 2d 203, 418 P.2d 227 (Utah 1966); State v. 
Taylor, 541 P.2d 1124, 1125 (Utah 1975); Slater v. Salt Lake 
City, 1115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, 160 (Utah 1949); See 
also, Aldine Apartments Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 426 
A.2d 1118, 112-22 (Pa. 1951), holding classifications valid 
if it is imposed on some standard capable of reasonable 
comprehension, such as the ability to produce income. 
This Court has held that such tax law's presumptive 
validity is such that the government need not even present 
proof of the reasons for its classifications. Baker v. 
Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979). 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that this 
legislative power to set legislative classifications for tax 
purposes is a Separation of Powers issue. It noted that the 
greatest deference should be afforded to the legislatures by 
the Courts in this area. It held: 
'In the field of taxation, more than other 
fields, the legislature possesses the greatest 
freedom in classification, and to attack such as a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment places the 
burden on the one attacking them to negate every 
conceivable basis which might support the 
classification.? Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 
84 L.Ed. 590 (1940), quoted in C & D Trailer Sales 
v. Taxation and Revenue Depart., 604 P.2d 835, 837 
(N.M. 1979). 
In a recent case, the U.S. Supreme Court noted another 
reason for the Courts to give deference to the legislative 
taxing classifications. It noted that it was uniquely the 
legislative body's obligation to weigh local factors and 
design a balanced tax system. It observed: 
'Traditionally classification has been a 
device for fitting tax programs to local 
needs and usages in order to achieve an 
equitable distribution of the tax burden. 
. . . Since the members of a legislature 
necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local 
conditions which this court cannot have, the 
presumption of constitutionality can be 
overcome only by the most explicit 
demonstration that a classification is a 
hostile and oppressive discrimination against 
the particular persons and classes.? Reagan 
v. Taxation With Representation of 
Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547, 76 L.Ed.2d 
129, 138 (1980) (footnotes omitted in the 
original quotation and emphasis added). 
Treatise writers have, similarly, noted the lawTs 
rightful deference to the legislative branch's power to 
define tax classifications. In sum, these treatise writers 
note: 
Equal protection of the law permits wide 
discretion in classification. 5 McQuillin 
Municipal Corporations Section 19.14 at 398; 
see also Section 319.13 at 391 (Third Revised 
Edition). 
The proof must show that the classification 
is wholly without any rational basis and is 
essentially arbitrary. Id. at 398 (Emphasis 
added). 
These rulings are not in conflict with the authority 
cited by the appellant-Hotels to the effect that the 
enabling power to tax is not inferred and that ambiguities 
in a taxing statute are construed in favor of the taxpayer. 
(Appellant-hotels' brief p. 37). Those concepts are not 
disputed by the City, but they are irrelevant to the issues 
See also, 5 McQuillin Municipal Corporations 41.03 at 267; 
Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 52 S.Ct. 
556, 76 L.Ed. 1102 (1932) holding that a reasonable basis is 
all that is necessary to adjust a classification for tax 
purposes. 
of this case. Here, appellants challenge the 
constitutionality of the ordinance and the classification 
decisions of the City's legislative body. These direct 
challenges to the legislative process are governed by the 
presumptions and burdens above discussed, not those dealing 
with the grant to enabling power or construction of an 
unclear tax law. 
The test, then, is whether there exists any reasonable 
distinction or differences in the taxed business, its 
operations, rights, privileges, public policy or tax policy 
to justify the legislative classification. The burden of 
proof is on the challenger to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt the arbitrariness of the classification. The 
government need not present any evidence; that is, the 
presumption of validity must be overcome by affirmative 
admissible evidence presented by the challenger. 
Although this issue was previously extensively briefed 
before the lower court, appellant-Hotels have not discussed 
these precedents; rather, their brief continues to premise 
its arguments on the concept that the tax law 
classifications are presumptively suspect. The appellant-
Hotels have failed to present the required proofs; thus, the 
decision of Judge Hanson should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE IMPOSITION OF A ONE PERCENT GROSS 
RECEIPTS OCCUPATION OR PRIVILEGE TAX ON 
THE PLAINTIFF AND OTHER HOTELS AND 
ROOMING HOUSES SIMILARLY SITUATED IS 
BASED ON REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL 
DISTINCTIONS. AS SUCH, IT IS A VALID 
CLASSIFICATION FOR PURPOSE OF RAISING 
REVENUE FOR MUNICIPAL PURPOSES. 
The precise taxing classification at issue in this case 
has already been approved by this Court; it approved, as a 
separate class for taxing purposes, innkeepers (hotels, 
motels, etc.) providing rental accommodations to persons 
occupying rooms for less than 30 days. Menlove v. Salt Lake 
County, 418 P.2d 227 (Utah 1966). 
In this case, the Court noted that a county tax (based 
on a percentage of gross receipts and imposed for the 
purpose of tourist promotion) was a pure revenue producing 
measure; as such, it was ruled an occupational privilege 
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tax. Therefore, the legislative branch of local 
government was exercising its revenue-producing prerogative 
and the taxing classification was upheld. In this case, the 
Court observed: 
Where neither the constitution nor the state 
imposes absolute restrictions on the power of 
taxation, the courts may not arbitrarily 
impose any, unless it clearly appears the tax 
imposed is oppressive or clearly and 
unreasonably discriminatory, and thus is an 
The appellant-Hotels argue the case is dintinguishable 
because it was a "special purpose" tax. (Appellants1 brief, 
p. 27). That fact was not determinative for the Menlove 
court; further, the hotels have failed to find any cases 
where any other court found that distinction violated an 
innkeeper tax classification. It is a distinction without a 
difference and fails to refute all of the other differences 
that also justify the classification. 
abuse of the taxing power. This court cannot 
set up its judgment against that of the 
[county] legislature in determining who shall 
be required to contribute to the revenues. 
Menlove v. Salt Lake County, 418 P.2d 227 
(Utah 1966) (Emphasis added). 
The Court specifically rejected the argument that the tax 
levied on a particular group, for the benefit of all 
businesses, rendered it invalid. In doing so, it quoted 
from the United States Supreme Court as follows: 
1The power to make distinction exists with 
full vigor in the field of taxation, where no 
firon rule1 of equality has ever been 
enforced upon the states. (citations 
omitted) Menlove v. Salt Lake County, supra 
at p. 230, citing New York Rapid 
Transportation Cor, v. City of New York, 303 
U.S. 573, 82 L.Ed. 1024. 
The Court also stated: 
. . . [T]he Fourteenth Amendment is not a 
limitation of a taxing power, unless the 
court is compelled to conclude that the act 
is so arbitrary that does not involve an 
exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes 
in substance and effect, a different and 
forbidden power, such as, confiscation of 
property. The court [United States Supreme 
Court] observed that collateral purposes are 
motives of the legislature of levying a tax 
of a kind what in breach of its lawful powers 
or matters beyond the scope of judicial 
inquiry. .Id. at p. 231 (Emphasis added). 
Appellant-Hotelsf arguments are a rewrite of the rejected 
arguments in Menlove and should similarly be rejected. 
This conclusion is buttressed, not only by Utah law and the 
rationale above stated, but by virtually every decision 
involving similar facts which the writer or appellants has 
been able to discover. The following are several cases 
involving the precise issue before this Court: 
1. In the case of Edwards v. City of Los Angeles, 119 
P.2d 370 (Cal.App. 1941), Los Angeles imposed a gross 
receipt's business occupation tax on those persons engaged 
in renting or letting any rooms in any hotel, rooming, 
boarding house, apartment house for lodging. The California 
Court ruled the classification valid and upheld the tax 
against all challenges, including a charge that it was 
discriminatory. 
2. In the case of City of Inglewood v. Wright, 364 
P.2d 569 (Colo. 1961), a revenue occupation tax computed 
from the gross receipts of businesses renting commercial or 
residential property within the city was challenged. It was 
upheld against a variety of challenges, including an 
assertion that it was an illegal income tax, was 
discriminatory, and otherwise constituted an invalid or 
unconstitutional classification. 
3. In the case of Chestnut, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 
389 S.W.3d 823 (Mo. 1965), the Missouri Supreme Court upheld 
a 2% gross receipts tax virtually identical to the one 
before this Court. Here the gross receipts occupation tax 
was levied on the daily rental receipts of hotels from 
transient guests, who by definition were those who rented 
rooms in hotel or motels for 31 days or less. Like the case 
before the bar, a challenge was made that this 
classification was discriminatory and unconstitutional in 
view of the fact that other businesses paid on a different 
formula; that is, some other businesses paid on fixed or 
flat license fee basis as little as $100 and others were 
taxed on rates as low as $1.75 per thousand of annual gross 
receipts. 
The Missouri Court held the legislative 
differentiations to be appropriate, constitutional and 
reasonable (both with regard to those businesses not paying 
a gross receipts tax and to hotels and motels, not catering 
to transients); it stated: 
A difference in the method of conducting a 
business is generally a sound basis for 
classification, particularly if it appears 
that the tax was fixed in proportion to the 
amount of business, which may be determined 
by different but reasonable methods.f 
(citation omitted) . . . Such division or 
classification is recognized generally 
throughout the business world; indeed, in the 
hotel and apartment trade, the difference 
between the business of furnishing living 
accommodations of transients and the business 
of supplying living accommodations to 
permanent guests or tenants is well known and 
accepted.T (citations omitted). It is not 
clearly apparent that the tax fixed by the 
board of aldermen is arbitrary, unreasonable, 
oppressive or prohibitive, virtually 
confiscatory or prohibitive of hotel and 
motel business, under the rule state in City 
of Washington v. Reed citation omitted. Id. 
at p. 832 (Emphasis added). 
4. In the City of Portsmouth v. Citizenfs Trust Co., 
222 S.E.2d 532 (Va. 1976), the Court upheld a City gross 
receipts business occupation tax levied on those businesses 
in the business of renting residential property. The Court 
correctly observed: 
. . . [T]he Supreme Court has held that equal 
protection does not compel identity of the 
treatment but fonly requires that 
classification rest on real and not feigned 
differences, that distinction has some 
relevance to the purpose for which the 
classification is made, and that different 
treatments not be so disparate, relative to 
the difference in classification, as to be 
wholly arbitrary.T (citation omitted). 
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In all of the writer's research, there is only one 
case voiding a classification or a gross receipts business 
occupation tax on hotels and motels, renting to persons on a 
5 
transient basis of six months or less. All other such 
decisions have following the Utah Menlove rationale and have 
held that such classification was entirely proper and 
constitutional. 
McQuillin summarizes the holding of these many 
decisions, upholding innkeepers as a separate taxing 
classification. This treatise observed: 
3 
For other older cases see upholding the classification of 
hotels, motels, etc. and the validity of a gross receipts 
tax on them based on differing rates computed on hotel size 
see: Cobb v. Durham County, 30 S.E. 338 (N.Carolina, 1898); 
Fulgrum v. Nashville, 7610 (8 LEA) 635 (1881); L.A. v. 
Landershim, 118 P. 215 (Cal. 1911); see also McBriety v. 
Baltimore, 148 A.2d 408 (Mc. 1959) upholding a tax on 
rooming houses and multiple family dwellings as a license 
tax on housing accommodations; White v. Moore, 46 P.2d 1077 
(Ariz. 1935), upholding a business occupation tax. 
4 
For a virtually complete compilation of all relevant cases 
see "Tax on Hotel-Motel Room Occupancy", 58 A.L.R. 4th 274-
326. 
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Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253 
(Ky.Ct.App. 1971) cited at p. 24 of appellant-Hotels' brief. 
This case has never been cited by any other court outside 
Kentucky and is devoid of supportive authority. 
However, hotels and boarding houses of a 
specified capacity, furnishing either board 
or lodging or both for compensation may be 
placed in a separate class, 9 McQuillin 
Municipal Corporation Section 26.119 at p. 
262-263 (3rd Ed.Rev.) (Emphasis added). 
The specific facts before this Court, likewise, 
demonstrated that there are numerous reasons to uphold the 
City's taxing classifications. See Statement of Facts 4-11, 
supra. 
These facts clearly demonstrate a rational reason to 
justify the classification. Therefore, this Court should 
follow the Menlove decision and rule that the City's 1% 
business occupation tax does not violate equal protection or 
due process in its classification. 
POINT III 
REVENUE LICENSE TAXES ARE NOT ASSESS-
MENTS OF BENEFITS AND SUCH TAXES ARE 
VALID, EVEN IF TAX PAYMENTS EXCEED THE 
VALUE OF GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES RECEIVED. 
In Point I of appellant-Hotels1 brief, they have 
continued an erroneous line of logic from their lower court 
arguments, which wrongly mixes cases dealing with regulatory 
and impact fees, confiscatory taxation and per se tax 
classification issues. Their argument stirs this, mostly, 
unrelated mix of authorities with an assertion that 
discovery was improperly limited by the lower court; thus, 
they argue factual issues exist which preclude summary 
Point 1A and B, appellant-Hotels' brief at pp. 13-25. 
j udgment. 
However, the legal theories (for which they seek 
discovery or upon which they assert disputed material 
factual issues exist) do not state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted, as a matter of law. The following point 
will discuss these issues. 
A- APPELLANT-HOTELS' AUTHORITIES WRONGLY 
CONFUSE REGULATORY AND FEE CASES WITH 
CITY POWER TO IMPOSE REVENUE LICENSE 
TAXES. 
To properly analyze appellant-Hotels1 argument, it must 
first be noted that there is a significant legal distinction 
between a license "revenue" measure and a "regulatory" one. 
McQuillin correctly summarizes the law as follows: 
License fees for regulation must bear a 
reasonable relation to the expense of 
regulation, as discussed in detail in the 
following section. However, this rule has no 
application to license fees or taxes enacted 
under the taxing powers for revenue purposes. 
9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations Section 
26.35 at p. 76 (3rd Ed.Rev.) (Emphasis 
added). 
Utah recognized this distinction of "regulation" versus 
"revenue" licensing as early as 1898. In this case, the 
Utah court upheld a revenue occupation tax on telephone 
companies imposed by Ogden, under the predecessor statute 
10-8-39 Utah Code Ann., 1953. It observed: 
It is held that the municipality is not 
limited to the mere expense of the 
regulation, but it may impose a reasonable 
license tax for the purpose of obtaining 
revenue necessary to meet the general 
expenses of such municipality. Ogden City v. 
Crossmanf 53 P. 985r 989 (Utah 1898) 
(Emphasis added); see also, Salt Lake City v. 
Christensen Co,, 95 P. 523 (Utah 1908). 
Appellants have ignored this distinction and wrongly 
argue against the legality of this revenue tax from 
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regulatory or impact fee cases. Admittedly in such cases, 
the correct rule of law is that the regulatory fee must 
reasonably relate to the cost of regulation. However, as 
above noted, that limitation is not applicable to revenue 
tax assessments, like the case at bar. The cases cited do 
not stand for the proposition asserted; that is, that a 
City's revenue tax can be challenged by comparing the costs 
of services to taxes paid. 
Salt Lake City v. Utah Light and Railway, 45 Utah 50 
Q 
142 P. 1067 (1914) cited by appellants is a "revenue" 
license dispute. However, in that suit the issue was 
whether a taxing classification distinction based only on 
See: Weber Basin Home Builders Assn. v. Roy City, 487 
P.2d 866 (Utah 1971), cited at appellant-Hotels1 brief at p. 
15, 20. This case is a building permit fee dispute where 
developers argued development permit assessment were not 
reasonably related to the cost of regulation. Banberry 
Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 
1981), cited at appellant-Hotels' brief p. 21. Similarly, 
this case is a development impact fee assessment imposed as 
a condition for a water connection and subdivision plat 
approval, not a revenue tax assessment. Call v. City of 
West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1908), cited at appellant-
Hotels1 brief at p. 21. In this case, the City imposed a 7% 
land donation requirement as an impact assessment as a 
condition for City development approvals to develop parks 
and flood control. 
Appellant-Hotels1 brief at p. 22. 
whether electrical service was metered or unmetered was 
without a "rational basis." The Court held: 
But in limiting the tax to those who use 
meters for the purpose mentioned in the 
ordinance destroys its uniformity, Id. at p. 
1071. 
The dicta quoted by appellants is not illuminative to the 
issues or many distinctions of innkeeper's business present 
9 
m this case. 
Likewise, the 1900 case of Cache County v. Jensen, 21 
Utah 207, 61 P. 303 (1900) is unavailing to appellants.10 
That case interpreted a County enabling statute and found 
the legislature had not granted them power to issue a 
revenue license tax. The Court noted that taxing authority 
would not be inferred and that the County only had 
"regulatory" powers, ^d. at p. 306, 307. The Cache 
holding relates only to the statutory provisions of counties 
and is not relevant to the issues of this City taxation 
case. 
9 
See Statement of Facts Nos. 4-11, supra and Discussion in 
Point II, supra. 
Appellant-Hotels' brief, p. 17. 
This Court subsequently affirmed the difference of county 
and city enabling powers to impose business revenue license 
taxes. Cf. Section 17-5-27 Utah Code Ann, and Mountain 
States Tel, and Tel. Co. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 113 
(Utah 1985) (County enabling authority) with broader city 
taxing power illustrated by Mountain States Tel, and Tel. 
Co. v. Salt Lake City, supra and granted powers in Section 
10-8-39, 80 Utah Code Ann. 
Lastly, the City has no quarrel with the general 
proposition that classifications of taxpayers must be based 
on rational distinctions. However, that principle is 
entirely different from equating the amount of taxes paid to 
the benefits received. When on applies the correct body of 
case law dealing with "revenue" licensing (as opposed to 
"regulatory" fees) appellant-Hotels* authority for its 
argument to equate tax payments with service delivery 
evaporates. The lower court ruling was correct and should 
be affirmed. 
B. THERE ARE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT JUSTIFYING A REMAND BECAUSE TAX 
PAYMENTS ARE NOT AN ASSESSMENT OF 
BENEFITS. 
Much of the appellant-Hotels1 argument before the lower 
court and that underpinning their claim before this Court is 
predicated on their interpretation of Continental Bank and 
Trust v. Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1979).12 
Appellant-Hotels claim that a factual dispute exists and 
assert the right to further discovery based on the theory 
that a taxpayer can claim discrimination and 
unconstitutional taxation, if it pays more taxes than it 
receives in back governmental services. The law is to the 
contrary and Continental Bank does not so hold. 
See appellant-Hotels1 brief, p. 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 
33. 
First, it must be noted that Courts consistently and 
uniformly held that there is no requirement that the 
benefits received by a taxpayer must equate to the taxes 
paid. The United States Supreme Court held as follows: 
TA tax is not an assessment of benefits. 
. . . The only benefit to which the taxpayer 
is constitutionally entitled is that derived 
from the enjoyment of the privilege of living 
in an organized society, established and 
safeguarded by the devotion of taxes to 
public purposes. . . . T Carmichael v. 
Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 522-
23, 81 L.Ed. 1245 (1937), quoted in Tiffany 
Const. Co., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 603 
P.2d 632, 634-35 (N.M. 1979) (Emphasis 
added). 
The Supreme Court, further, observed: 
"The Fourteenth Amendment does not require 
taxes to be levied according to benefits 
received by the person or entity . . . 
[paying them]. Missouri Pac. Railroad v. 
Road District, 266 U.S. 187, 69 L.Ed. 237 
(1924) (Emphasis added). 
McQuillin summarizes this universal principle applicable to 
all general revenue taxation (as opposed to regulatory or 
fee assessments) as follows: 
So it is immaterial that no benefit is 
derived by the taxpayer from the payment of 
taxes, or that he is less benefited than 
others who pay the same or less tax. 16 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporation, Id. at 
Section 44.50 at p. 110 (3rd Rev.Ed.) 
(Emphasis added); see also Id.. Section 44.47. 
Utah has specifically upheld this view of the law in a 
case virtually identical to the one before the Court. Like 
the case before this Court, hotels asserted that a gross 
receipts tax was unreasonable and arbitrary because they did 
not obtain measurable benefits; this Court held: 
A tax is not an assessment of benefits.f 
(citation omitted) Taxes are repeatedly 
imposed on a group or class without regard to 
the responsibility for the creation of relief 
of the conditions to be remedies. . . . 
There is no need to be a relationship between 
a class of taxpayers and the purpose of the 
appropriation. Menlove v. Salt Lake^County, 
supra at p. 230. (Emphasis added). 
The Continental Bank case holding and rationale is not 
to the contrary. In this case, a single taxpayer which was 
really a separate enclave and provided essentially all of 
its own municipal services, but was singled out for 
oppressive taxation. Significant to the Court was the fact 
that this sole business "shoulders the (tax) burden alone. . 
." Ld. at p. 1245. Also, important was the fact that the 
business operated on a low profit margin, payed no 
dividends, was heavily in debt and the assessment 
represented a ". . . potentially crippling tax on a single 
business for the benefit of the community as a whole . . . " 
Id. at p. 1246 (Emphasis added). 
The Continental Bank case is factually poles apart from 
the case at bar. There, the City (in a sham classification 
really comprised of a single taxpayer) established tax rates 
For other authority holding that a revenue taxing measure 
need not bear any relationship to the cost or the amount of 
services delivered to the taxes entity. See: 9 McQuillin 
Section 26-35 at p. 76 (3rd Rev.Ed.); Ogden City v. 
Crossman, 53 P. 985, 989 (Utah 1898); Blue Top Motel v. City 
of Stevens Point, 320 N.W.2d 172 (Wis. 1982); Edwards v. 
City of L.A., 119 P.2d 370, 372 (Cal.App. 1942); Chestnut 
Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 389 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985). 
near the limits of economic survival and required that 
business to fund a major portion of the City budget. To the 
contrary in the case at bar, the class of taxpayers includes 
over 100 hotels and motels which each receive a full 
umbrella of health, safety and other City services. Each 
contributes to and feeds off of the City's economic 
environment in a unique way; the City's innkeepers are not 
an isolated self-contained sub-community as was that 
taxpayer. (See Statement of Facts and discussion in Point 
II, supra)« 
Neither are the innkeepers oppressively taxed to the 
point of extinction. It is interesting that of the 100 
businesses within the class, all but these two appellants 
have not pursued a challenge to the tax. That lack of 
participation hardly suggests the oppression and 
discrimination required by case law as illegal and 
confiscatory taxation. 
Further, the Continental Bank case does not uphold 
appellant-Hotels' suggestion that the Due Process Clause 
invites the Court to compare benefits received with taxes 
paid; by close analysis, it is really a confiscatory tax 
case. It does not support appellant-Hotels' premises that 
the lower court erred in dismissing the case and granting 
Utah Power and Light Company's Motion for a Protective Order 
against discovery. 
It must be noted that before the lower court, the 
Hotels argued that Summary Judgment should not be granted, 
and proffered evidence that they wanted to compare tax 
payments made by innkeepers with services and taxes paid by 
14 
others in the downtown area. In their brief, filed with 
this Court, they similarly argue error because they want to 
15 
compare " . . . taxes paid to benefits received." As above 
argued, this analysis is not a claim or theory upon which 
they may legally challenge this tax. 
The discovery against which Utah Power & Light was 
protected went to the this issue: The Hotel sought the 
amount of franchise taxes paid by all innkeepers through 
that utility. Appellant-Little America sought privileged, 
sensitive and confidential information about competitorsf 
business operations; further, it was burdensome and 
14 
See Answer to City's Third Set of Interrogatories, p. 2, 
wherein the appellant, Little America states: 
"[It] intends to proffer evidence . . . as to 
the tax burden imposed on [it] . . . in 
comparison with those imposed on average 
residents . . . or owners of other commercial 
property in a downtown area." (Emphasis 
added) 
15 
Appellant-Hotels1 brief, p. 25. 
It should be noted that the affidavit of Mr. Norman was 
the subject of an objection, which the lower court never 
ruled upon because, even accepting the foundationless 
opinions, summary judgment was proper, as a matter of law. 
(R-870-75). 
oppressive to the utility. However, more importantly, the 
information would add nothing to the suit, except the amount 
of total taxes paid for appellants' invalid theory that a 
comparison of benefits to tax payments was important. 
It is respectfully submitted that appellant-Hotels1 
extenuated argument concerning its asserted lack of benefits 
in comparison to the amount of taxation paid by them is 
irrelevant and immaterial. Those arguments may have some 
applicability to a challenge alleging confiscatory taxation; 
however, that cause of action has not been pled. Therefore, 
the lower court's rulings on discovery and its summary 
judgment should be affirmed. 
C. THE CITY'S HOTEL OCCUPATION TAX IS NOT 
CONFISCATORY OR CONSTITUTIONALLY 
OPPRESSIVE. 
The United States Supreme Court, Utah and virtually 
every other state decision is clear that establishing a tax 
rate is purely a legislative function The Courts are loath 
to question the reasonableness or the amount of a tax, so 
long as it is not an assessment beyond the legitimate needs 
Appellant-Little America's first subpoena was quashed on 
objection by Utah Power and Light Company. A second 
subpoena duces tecum was more generic as to the general 
class of innkeepers in an effort to avoid privilege and 
confidentiality concerns. However, it was still burdensome 
and the information ruled irrelevant because it only went to 
the issue of an assessment of benefits tax theory, properly 
rejected by the learned District Judge. See, first 
Protective Order and Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment 
and Granting Protective Order (R-1141 attached as Appendix 
"4"). 
of the taxing entity or does not constitute an abuse of the 
taxing power, by being tantamount to a confiscation of 
private property. 16 McQuillin Municipal Corporations, 
Section 44.25 at p. 65. The United States Supreme Court 
held: 
'Except in rare and special cases, the due 
process of law contained in the Fifth 
Amendment is not a limitation on the taxing 
power conferred upon congress by the 
Constitution . . . An no reason exists for 
applying a different rule against the state 
in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . 
That clause is applicable to a taxing statute 
such as the one here assailed only if the act 
be so arbitrary as to compel a conclusion 
that is not involved in exertion of the 
taxing power, but constitutes in substance 
and effect, a direct exertion of a different 
and forbidden power, as, for example, the 
confiscation of property. Marnano Co. v. 
Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 78 L.Ed. 1109 (1934). 
Likewise, our Supreme Court observed: 
. . . by granting the power [power to tax] 
the legislature imposed upon the city council 
the discretion to determine just how far they 
could go within the limits imposed, . . . as 
to be the best judge of the necessities. 
. . . In such cases the council [city 
legislative body] and not the court, is the 
proper repository of the public trust; . . . 
Under the circumstances, the court ought not 
to interfere upon the ground that the 
ordinance is unreasonable, but is restricted 
to the constitutionality of the act granting 
the power. Ogden v. Crossman, supra, at p. 
989 (Emphasis added). 
In measuring when the "line-of-abuse" has been crossed, 
this Court and many others have stated that the facts must 
demonstrate that the tax was beyond the City's needs or 
would destroy the taxed business class. This Court stated 
that a city lacked the power to tax, only when it acted: 
• • • Beyond the necessities of the city, or 
. . . one so excessive as to prohibit or 
destroy the occupation or business upon 
which it is imposed." Ogden v. Crossman, 
supra at p. 989 (Emphasis added). 
Other Courts considering this issue have similarly ruled. 
For example the Washington Supreme Court upheld a 2-1/2% 
gross receipts business or occupation tax on those selling 
fuel oil, when they complained they were unfairly 
discriminated against by virtue of a parallel 5% occupation 
tax on natural gas, electrical and telephone suppliers. It 
held: 
Therefore, for a tax to be declared invalid, 
it must be shown that it actually tends to 
destroy as a whole the business, industry, or 
entity which is being taxed. It is not 
enough that the tax imposes an unpleasant or 
heavy financial burden on individual 
operators or the industry as a whole. To be 
invalid, a tax must be so oppressive or 
unreasonable as to amount to a confiscation 
or destruction of the business being taxed. 
The Oil Heat Institute of Washington v. Town 
of Mulilteo, 498 Jg2d 864, 866 (Wash. 1972) 
(Emphasis added). 
The case at bar presents no facts where the hotel 
industry is going to be subject to the confiscation of 
property, under the standard enunciated by these many 
Courts. Further, the facts are not in dispute that the tax 
was imposed to meet City needs and not in excess of budget. 
Accord: Koffman v. City of Tucson, 433 P.2d 282, 286 
(Ariz. 1967); Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 
369, 41 L.E.2d 132, 137, upholding a 20% gross receipts tax 
on commercial parking business, even if the tax destroyed 
particular businesses. 
Therefore, the Summary Judgment granted by the lower 
court against the appellant-Hotels was proper. The 
appellant-Hotels have failed in fact and law to establish a 
claim of a City abuse of its taxing power sufficient to 
constitute an "oppressive" or "confiscatory" tax, which 
violates due process or equal protection principles of the 
U.S. or State Constitutions. 
POINT IV 
THE LICENSE TAX IMPOSED ON THE CLASS OF 
TRANSIENT ROOM PROVIDERS BY THE CITY IS 
WITHIN THE CITYfS ENABLING POWER AND IS 
NOT AN ILLEGAL INCOME OR SALES TAX. 
A. UTAH ENABLING POWER AUTHORIZES THE CITY 
TO ADOPT A GROSS RECEIPTS OCCUPATION 
TAX. 
State law specifically provides: 
They [cities] may raise revenue by levying 
and collecting a license fee or tax on any 
business within the limits of the City, and 
regulate the same by ordinance; . . . 10-8-
80 Utah Code Ann., 1953 (Emphasis added). 
It also clearly authorizes cities to tax hotels; the law 
provides" 
They [cities] may license, [and] tax . . . 
hotels and other public places, boarding 
houses, . . . lodging houses . . . and all 
others pursuing like occupations. . . . 10-
8-39 Utah Code Ann., 1953 (Emphasis added). 
In construing this specific grant of power, this Court 
has ruled that cities have the power to impose an occupation 
tax computed from the gross receipts of the business. 
Davis v. Ogden City, 215 P.2d 616, 621 (Utah 1950). 
Specifically, with regard to the appellants' claim, 
this Court held: 
An occupation tax does not become an income 
tax [or a sales tax] because the amount 
levied is based on gross income. Id. at p. 
624 (Emphasis added). 
Subsequently, the Utah Supreme Court again upheld the 
per se validity of a Salt Lake City ordinance levying a 
gross receipts tax on a business, under enabling power 
granted in Section 10-8-80. In so ruling, the Court stated: 
"On its face the taxing scheme is . . . constitu-
tional . . . " Mountain States Tel. & Tel, v. Salt Lake 
City, 596 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah 1979). 
B. THE LICENSE TAX IS NOT A SALES OR INCOME 
TAX. 
The recognition that a gross receipts tax has not 
become an illegal income tax or sales tax by virtue of its 
tax on gross receipts is also virtually uniformly upheld in 
other jurisdictions. McQuillin states as follows: 
The power to license for revenue as well as 
police purposes may be conferred upon the 
municipal corporation. 
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Accord: Town v. Hackleburg v. Northwest Alabama Gas 
District, 277 Atlanta 355, 170 So.2d 792 (Ala. 1964); 
National Biscuit Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 197 P.2d 788 
(Cal. 1948); In Re 320 West Thirty-Seventh Street Inc., 22 
N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1939) holding a gross receipt based 
business tax not a sales tax. 
The amount of the license tax or fees may be 
based on the amount of business done or sales 
made, measured by gross sales, gross receipts 
or gross income. 9 McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations, Section 26.30 at p. 62, Section 
26.37 at p. 83 (Emphasis added); see also, 
Id. Section 44.12, p. 32; Section 44.190, p. 
475. 
This work further summarizes a large body of law regarding 
the gross receipts tax as follows: 
The term [gross receipts tax] while amply 
descriptive of the methods of computation, is 
of no significance in determining the nature 
of the exaction imposed in any particular tax 
legislation. 
A gross receipts tax is not invalid as a tax 
on income or on property. McQuillin, Id., at 
Section 44.192 at p. 490. (Emphasis added). 
See also P. Lorillard Co. v. Seattle, 83 
Wash.2d 586, 521 P.2d 208 (1974). 
Thus, the law is virtually uniform in holding that a gross 
receipt tax is not a sales or income tax. 
Specifically, those jurisdictions considering the issue 
before this Court concerning the validity of gross receipt 
taxes on rooming houses or hotels have held them valid 
against challenges that they were illegal sales or other 
types of taxes, not within the taxing authority of the City. 
For example, a 1982 decision by the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin upheld a 4% gross receipt business occupation tax, 
computed income derived from innkeepers, providing rooming 
accommodations for transient guests staying for less than a 
month. The Court upheld the City tax against challenges it 
was an illegal income tax and beyond the City's enabling 
power. It held: 
"We hold that the City can use the gross 
receipts as the basis by which to determine 
the room tax." Blue Top Motel v. City of 
Stevens Point, 320 N.W.2d 172 (Wis. 1982). 
For other cases see: Edwards v. City of Los Angeles, 119 
P.2d 370, 372 (Cal.App. 1941); Chestnut, Inc. v. City of St. 
20 
Louis, 389 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1965), upholding a two percent 
gross receipts tax on daily rental receipts received on 
hotel from transient guests; Green v. Panama City Housing 
Authority, 110 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1959) cited at 93 A.L.R.2d 
1140, holding a gross receipts room rental tax was ruled to 
20 
Appellant-Hotels cite a 1979 Missouri case that a 1% 
gross receipt tax was an illegal sales tax imposed by a city 
at page 42 of their brief. That case did not overrule 
Chestnut and did not hold that a business occupation tax 
based on gross receipts was illegal. Here, a tax on food 
and drink transaction was held to be a sales tax because of 
the way the tax was structured, which taxed net sales to the 
customer. The court, however clearly notes: "This case 
does not concern a municipality's power to enact such a 
[gross receipts business occupation] tax." Suzy's Bar & 
Grill, Inc. v. Kansas City, 580 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Mo. 1979) 
be an excise and not an income tax; State v. Heymann, 115 
So. 101 (La. 1933), a one percent tax on income from 
receipts earned on the rental of office buildings was ruled 
to be an excise and not an income tax or property tax; Dicks 
v. Naff, 500 S.W.2d 350 (Ark. 1973), upholding 1% gross 
22 
receipt tax on hotels and restaurants. 
Appellant-Hotels cite the Lexington v. Motel 
Developers, Inc. case for the proposition that a gross 
receipt business tax (like Salt Lake City's) is per se void 
The appellant-Hotels cite at p. 42 of this Brief a lower 
court of appeals Florida case, affirmed by the Florida 
Supreme Court, which held void a $10.00 tax on the sales of 
motore vehicles on each $1,000 of value, reduced to $1.00 on 
sales over $3,000. The court here found significant that 
the ordinance taxed "sales" not gross receipts. Those facts 
have little or nothing in common with the facts and 
ordinance here under discussion. Birdsong Motors, Inc. v. 
Tampa, 235 S.2d 318 (D.Ct.App. Fla. 1970) afffd 261 So.2d 1 
(Fla. 1972). 
At page 40 and 46 of appellant-Hotels' brief, they cite 
Minturn v. Foster Lumber Co., 548 P.2d 1276 (Colo. 1976) for 
the proposition that all gross receipt occupation license 
taxes are illegal income taxes. Interestingly, the court 
cites with approval City of Inglewood v. Wright, 364 P.2d 
569 (Colo. 1961) which upheld a tax computed at $4.00 per 
room. This case was (in reality) a gross receipt or a 
property tax, which was ruled beyond the City's enabling 
power. It correctly ruled that this tax was not an income 
or a property tax, but a legal occupation license tax. A 
room charge of $4.00 can be translated to a percentage of 
the rental, but Minturn discussion fails to discuss this 
issue. Minturn stands alone and without acceptance by any 
other reported decision. It is specifically in 
contradiction to Utah law and the vast majority of other 
decisions approving occupation license fees, determined by a 
percentage of gross receipts. 
22 
Case cited erroneously by appellants at p. 35 of their 
brief as supporting contrary position. 
as a sales tax. Contrary to the implication in 
appellants1 brief, that case, holds that the gross receipts 
business occupation tax for hotels was not void as a sales 
tax. It expressly stated of the 5% license tax on room 
rentals: 
"We conclude the tax here under consideration 
properly may be characterized as a 
permissible license tax which the City of 
Lexington may impose on a business and is not 
an excise [sales] tax which cities . . . are 
not empowered to levy." Lexington v. Motel 
Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253, 256 
(Emphasis added), voiding the tax on an 
invalid classification, which issue was 
discussed supra. 
The other cases cited in appellant-Hotels' brief on this 
point likewise do not stand for the proposition asserted or 
See page 41 of appellant-Hotels' brief, quoting a 
position from a concurring judge expressing a concurring 
opinion, expressly rejected by the majority. 
are clearly distinguishable. 
The uncontroverted facts demonstrate that the tax in 
question was intended to be and has all the incidents of a 
privilege or occupation Business Revenue Tax. (a) The tax 
is called and passed as a license tax; (b) The tax on 
innkeepers is imposed on the party engaged in business, not 
the consumer for the privilege of doing business in the 
In Columbus v. Atlanta Cigar Co., Inc., 143 S.E.2d 416 
(Ct.App.Ga. 1965), cited at p. 42 of appellant-Hotels1 
brief, the court specifically approved of business 
occupation taxes computed on gross receipts. It noted that 
its holding prohibiting sales tax impositions by the City" 
" . . . shall not be construed to apply to a . . . occupation 
or franchise tax based on gross receipts or on a gross 
receipts basis." Id. at p. 418 (Emphasis added). In that 
case the court found that a 2 cent tax on each 20 cigarettes 
possessed by anyone was preempted by a state statute. 
Further: "It is clear that the tax . . . [is not] imposed on 
one for the privilege of doing business . . ., but is a 
sales or use tax imposed on individual transactions . . . " 
Id. at p. 418. (Emphasis added). 
In City of Homer v. Gangl, 650 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1982), cited 
at page 43 of appellant-Hotels' brief, the question of sales 
versus license tax was not even at issue. The city, through 
a special referendum vote, passed a 5% transient room tax 
under its perceived general revenue taxing powers; it was 
not structured or even asserted to be an occupation license 
tax. The room tax was based on the: "actual rental of a 
room, and imposed, computed and collected according to 
traditional sales tax methods . . . " Id., at p. 399. It was 
structured as a tax on each transaction and not on the 
privilege of doing business; as such, it was held void as a 
sales tax. Appellants1 assertion that the tax was "similar" 
to Salt Lake's tax is simply untrue. 
For a discussion SuzyTs Bar & Grill, Inc. v. W.F. Jensen 
Candy Co., and Eugene Theatre Co., Coos Bay, Birdsong 
Motors, Inc. See footnotes 20, and 21, supra. 
City; (c) In computation of gross receipts, there is no 
deduction permitted for any operating expenses or any 
included excise taxes on products used; and (d) It is 
irrelevant to the City if the tax is included in the cost of 
appellant-Hotels' operation or surcharged to their patrons. 
See Statement of Facts; Chapter 30, Title 20 Revised 
Appellant-Hotels suggest that the fact that the tax is 
assessed against the business is irrelevant in 
distinguishing a sales tax from an authorized occupation or 
privilege license tax. Page 40 of appellant-Hotels? brief. 
However, every case on the subject, including those cited by 
appellants, note this factor as relevant distinction. 
Sales taxes are on imposed individual "transactions" and 
ordinarily assessed by statutory authorization at the point 
of sale to the consumer. Similarly, the Utah Code dealing 
with sales taxes provides: "The word 'tax' means the tax 
payable by the purchaser . . . or the aggregate amount of 
taxes due from the vendor . . . " Utah law imposes the sales 
tax "upon every retail sales" and the law specifically 
requires collection at the point of sale; it says vendors 
" . . . shall be responsible for the collection of the amount 
of the [sales] tax imposed on the sale [transaction]." 59-
15-2, 4, 5; 11-1-1 et seq. Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended 
(Emphasis added). 
By contrast, license taxes are imposed on business receipts. 
That distinction is a major "incident" to demonstrate the 
difference between a sales and a license tax. The fact that 
the vendor is liable, if he does not collect the tax is 
irrelevant to the structure or "incidents" of these 
different taxes. 
Appellant-Hotels assert no new privilege was conferred by 
the change in the rate structure for the occupation tax. 
Page 41 of appellant's brief. Tax rates continually change; 
the Utah Supreme Court specifically held cities had the 
power to increase license tax rates in Mt. States Tel. & 
Tel, v. Ogden City, 487 P.2d 849 (Utah 1971). Appellant-
Hotels' privilege to do business in Salt Lake is contingent 
on paying license fees and their ipse dixit statement to the 
contrary is not supported by any law or facts known to this 
writer and appellant-Hotels have cited none. 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, attached as Appendix "8". 
The tax is not a "sales tax" because it taxes the 
business for the privilege of operating within the City and 
is not a tax on the "transaction" assessed against the 
consumer, based on the value of the service or commodity 
received. It is not an "income tax" because it lacks the 
incidents of this type of a tax, such as taxing "net" 
income, generally on a progressive rate basis. The tax is 
what it facially purports to be; it is a privilege or 
occupation privilege revenue tax on a distinct class of 
businesses and should be upheld. 
POINT V 
CITY'S ORDINANCE HAS NOT BEEN PREEMPTED 
BY STATE LAW. 
28 Appellant-Hotels contend that the City tax is 
preempted under the State enabling statute which allowed 
County governments to establish recreation, tourist and 
convention bureaus. See 17-31-1 et seq. Utah Code Ann., 
1953, Chapter 12 of Title 59 Utah Code Ann., 1953. The 
following point will demonstrate the fallacy of this 
assertion. 
Also see, Kansas City v. John Deere Co., 577 S.W.2d 633 
(Mo.); United Airlines, Inc. v. Joseph, 121 N.Y.S.2d 692; 
Evers v. Daveville, 61 S.2d 78 each holding that a gross 
receipts business occupation tax was not a "sales tax." 
See p. 47 of appellant-Hotels? brief. 
It is undisputed that where a state has preempted a 
legislative field, including taxation, local government may 
not intrude into the area. Antieau, Municipal Corporation 
Law, Vol. 2A Section 21.10; 16 McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations Section 44.190a at p. 477. 
However, Antieau also correctly summarizes many cases 
by stating: 
A state tax regulatory in nature does not 
ordinarily preclude a municipal tax levied 
for revenue. Even when a state has occupied 
a field by regulation, local governments can 
generally tax businesses carried on within 
their boundaries and enforce such taxes by 
requiring business license taxes for revenue. 
Id. Section 21.10 
In the case before the bar, however, there exist a 
specific grant of power for cities to pass occupation taxes 
and express Utah case law which permits the tax to be 
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computed on gross receipts. Therefore, appellant-Hotels' 
challenge must be premised on an "implied" preemption. In 
deciding such issues, Courts attempt to determine "intent" 
of the State legislature. Speaking to this issue of 
preemption, this Court noted of the power of local 
governments to adopt ordinances as follows: 
A state cannot empower local governments to 
do that which the state itself does not have 
authority to do. In addition, local 
governments are without authority to pass any 
ordinance prohibited by, or in conflict with, 
state statutory law. (citation omitted) 
See 10-9-39, 80 Utah Code Ann, and discussion supra. 
Also an ordinance is invalid if it intrudes 
into an area which the Legislature has 
preempted by comprehensive legislation 
intended to blanket a particular field. 
State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1121 
(Utah 1980) (Emphasis added). 
In a leading case, our sister state, Alaska, recently 
considered an issue similar to the one before the bar and 
articulated these principles. Liberati v. Bristol Bay 
Burrough, 584 P.2d 1115 (Ala. 1978). In this case, a 
municipality levied a 3% gross receipts tax on all fish 
caught within the Burrough of Bristol Bay. The state had 
already imposed a 3% tax on fisheries, a part of which tax 
was shared with Alaska municipalities. 
Fishermen contested the tax, among other reasons, 
charging that it constituted an illegal severance tax. 
Specifically, they complained that the city tax was 
preempted by the state tax on the same income on the sale of 
fish. Alternatively, they argued specific commodity sales 
tax, outside the city's taxation power and preempted by 
state law. 
The Court rejected each of these arguments and held 
(similar to State v. Hutchinson, supra) that Alaska cities 
did not follow the archaic Dillon Rule of strict 
construction. After noting general statutory authority for 
city taxation, the Alaska Court discussed the issue of 
preemption. It noted: 
Merely because the state has enacted 
legislation concerning a particular subject 
does not mean that all municipal power to act 
on the same subject is lost. . . . only 
where an ordinance substantially interferes 
with the effective functioning of a state 
statute or regulation or its underlying 
purpose. Id. at p. 1122. 
It also held: 
In view of the constitutional and statutory 
commandment that municipal power be broadly 
interpreted in Alaska, we adopt the view that 
there is no general prohibition against like 
municipal and state taxes. Id. at p. 1122 
(Emphasis added); see also, 56 Am.Jur. 
"Municipal Corporations" Section 374 at p. 
408. 
The strong presumption of validity of municipal 
ordinances requires that the "preemption" by the state be 
clearly manifest before it can be held the powers of cities 
has been withdrawn. Junction City v. Lee, 532 P.2d 1292 
(Kan. 1975); Klimet v. Ghent, 423 NYS 2d 517 (NY 1979). 
Also preemption cannot apply where there exists no conflict. 
56 Am.Jur. Municipal Corporations Section 374 at p. 409, 
411. 
Consistent with this clear law, Utah has upheld a 6% 
gross receipt business occupation tax on public utilities, 
regulated by the Public Service Commission against a 
challenge that cities were preempted by the State regulatory 
scheme. Mountain States Tel, and Tel, v. Ogden, supra. 
^0 
See also, 72 Harvard L.Rev. "Conflict Between State 
Statutes and Municipal Ordinances" 737, 745 (1959) (Emphasis 
added); see also: Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 
151, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978). 
Based on similar principles, other Courts have also 
upheld City gross receipts tax on amusement businesses, 
holding they were not preempted by State sales tax laws. 
Estelle Realty, Inc. v. City of Mayfield Heights, 199 N.E.2d 
875 (Ohio 1964). They held that the gross receipts tax is 
not in conflict with the corporate tax or foreign 
corporation franchise tax. National Biscuit Co. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 98 A.2d 183 (Pa. 1953). 
Thus, it can be summarized that preemption occurs 
where: (a) There is an express prohibition by State 
statute, or (b) the taxing scheme would substantially 
interfere or make impossible the performance of a state 
revenue producing or regulatory undertaking. None of these 
conditions exist or are alleged in the case before the bar. 
The State statutes here in question does not even 
concern itself with State regulation or with producing 
revenue for the State of Utah. Rather, it is merely an 
enabling statute permitting counties of the state to raise 
money (if they so choose) for the promotion of recreation, 
31 tourist and convention bureaus. This permissive authority 
31 
The law urged to be precursive by the Appellant-Hotels 
specifically provides that it is not mandatory; it states of 
its purpose that: 
" . . . the method of financing such bureaus 
is not exclusive or mandatory." See title of 
the act quoted in the annotation of 17-31-1 
Utah Code Ann., 1953. 
It also has no more dignity or effect than that granting 
City enabling authority under 10-8-39 Utah Code Ann., 1953. 
to raise funds certainly demonstrates a lack of any 
"manifest" legislative intent to preempt City taxing 
authority. 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that business 
occupation tax does not substantially interfere with or 
preclude state regulatory purpose or function and the City 
tax should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The City has clear enabling authority for a gross 
receipts business occupation revenue tax under Sections 10-
8-39 and 80 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Further, computing a 
business license tax based on gross receipts of a business 
does not render it a impermissible sales or income tax. The 
City has not been preempted from the imposition of a license 
when the State granted counties the power to, 
simultaneously, tax the same businesses. Since the tax 
classification is based on rational distinctions, it is 
constitutional. The lower court's Summary Judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of February, 
1988. 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
RFC:cc 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION OF NOVEMBER 30, 1983 (R-913) 
F'LED IN CLERK'S OFFiCE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE Hft^ TTD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al. , 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-82-5220 
This matter comes before the Court on cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment between the various plaintiffs and the defendants 
Also before the Court are cross Motions to Strike all or portions 
of affidavits filed by the respective parties in support of or 
in opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment. This matter 
was extensively briefed and argued by the parties' respective 
counsel. Following argument, the Court took the matter under 
advisement and has now considered further the oral arguments 
made by counsel for the respective parties, the exhaustive 
Memoranda submitted by all parties, reviewed the cases cited by 
the parties, and has conducted further independent research on 
the questions and issues raised. 
ooo^ic 
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The Court is now fully advised on the issues, and therefore 
enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
The Court declines to deal individually or in depth with 
the multitude of legal issues raised by the various parties, 
inasmuch as the legal Memoranda of the respective parties 
accomplish that task in an extremely adequate fashion, and to 
restate those legal arguments here would only tend to unduly 
lengthen this Memorandum Decision. 
With regard to some of the issues raised by the parties, 
the Court is satisfied that the application of proper law and 
proper legal analysis allows this Court to make disposition 
of those issues as a matter of law. Other issues, however, 
necessarily encompass disputed material issues of fact that 
under the rules applicable to motions for summary judgment, 
prohibit determination as a matter of law, and require full 
resolution of those contested issues of fact by.a trier of fact. 
The Court is of the opinion that the affidavits to which 
objections have been raised, should be allowed, for purposes 
of these Motions, at least for determination as to the weight 
to be given to the statements offered by the various affiants. 
The Court is mindful of the potential foundational difficulties 
that exist in some or all of the affidavits, and has considered 
those potential foundational problems in determining the weight 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL, ET AL 
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to be given to the respective affidavits. The cross Motions 
to Strike affidavits (referred to by the defendant as "Objections'1) 
are denied. The Court has considered the affidavits in light of 
the above standards and even giving the appropriate weight to 
the affidavits, the affidavits lead this Court to the inescapable 
conclusion that a portion of the issues raised in the respective 
Motions for Summary Judgment contain material questions of fact 
prohibiting disposition of this case as a matter of law. 
The Court concludes, based upon the undisputed facts or 
upon those facts where no "substantial" disputed facts exist, 
and upon application of the legal authorities urged by the 
defendants, which the Court accepts as proper and appropriate 
under the circumstances of this case, that Summary Judgment in 
part as suggested above, is appropriate. The Court finds in 
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs on all legal 
issues raised by the pleadings and Motions, together with those 
suggested in the supporting Memoranda, with the exception of the 
issue of "classification" and whether or not such a classification 
is arbitrary and/or discriminatory. A determination of the issue 
of the reasonableness of the classification under the circum-
stances of this case must be based on the facts as they may 
eventually be found by a trier of fact. The affidavits, 
considered in the light set out above, make clear that contested 
issues of fact remain for ultimate resolution at trial on the 
classification issue. 
O00?-)l-
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The legal authorities and positions urged by the plaintiffs 
regarding the validity of the defendant Salt Lake City's ordinance 
other than the "classification" issue are not, in the Court's 
judgment well taken or are otherwise not applicable in this case. 
While the plaintiffs attempt to raise fact questions in 
some limited areas in their Reply Memorandum, for example: 
interference with interstate commerce, there exists no "genuine 
issue of material fact" so as to prohibit Summary Judgment on 
those issues. 
Accordingly, the Motions of the respective plaintiffs for 
Summary Judgment are denied. The Motion for Summary Judgment 
of the defendants is granted in part and denied in part in 
conformance with this Memorandum Decision. 
Counsel for the defendant is requested to prepare an Order 
reflecting the foregoing, and submit the same, to the Court for 
review and signature pursuant to Rule 2.9/tt the Rules of 
Practice for the District Courts of the/State of Utah. 
Dated this ^& day of No^^beV\ 19& 
JTH^/R. HANSON 
JTRICT^JUDGE 
i i , > 
]
 / 
000 i.'jc 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this J- day of November, 1983: 
Lon Rodney Kump 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent M. Winterholler 
James M. Elegante 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Pearson 
Enterprises, Boyer-Gardner Hotel 
Properties, Tri-Arc Hotel Associates, 
and Holiday Inns, Inc. 
185 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Dorothy C. Pleshe 
Attorney for Plaintiff Utah 
Hotel Company 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Roger F. Cutler 
Attorney for Defendants 
100 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
APPENDIX II 
JUDGMENT ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R-924) 
F!L£D IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Sait Lake Count", Utah 
JAN 16 1964 
ROGER F . CUTLER 
S a l t Lake C i t y A t t o r n e y 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t s 
100 C i t y & County B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : 535-7788 
H D., ., „ „ « . -inaicy.QiOSrd Cist. Court 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL ) 
CORPORATION, a Utah ) 
corporation, et al., ) 
vs. 
Plaintiffs, ) 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al., ) 
Defendants. ) 
JUDGMENT ON MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C 82-5220 
The plaintiffs Pearson Enterprises Partnership Company, 
Boyer-Gardner Hotel Properties Partnership, Tri-Arc Hotel 
Associates, and Holiday Inns, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and the defendants1 cross Motion for Summary Judgment 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Judge Timothy 
R. Hanson on the 25th day of March, 1983. The Court on said date 
further considered the defendants1 objections and motion to 
strike plaintiff's affidavits. The court havinq reviewed the 
memorandum of counsel, having conducted its own independent 
research, having heard the arguments of counsel, havinq entered 
i\i\:\*\™* 
its Memorandum Decision, and being fully advised in the premises 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. The aforesaid plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment should be and the same is denied, with prejudice. 
2. The defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
in part. All of the plaintiffs1 claims are dismissed with 
prejudice, excepting only the issue of the legality of tax 
classification of the City ordinance subject of the within 
dispute and whether or not such classification is arbitrary 
and/or discriminatory as applied. 
3. The defendants' objection to the Affidavit submitted by 
the plaintiffs is denied. / 
DATED this jp day of \M^C/^hCCf / , 198#? 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
By 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Judgment on Motions for Summary Judgment, by depositing the same 
in the U.S. mail, postaqe prepaid, this ^r"1^ day of VJ^A*C ^4\c<X-y 
1983 to the following: 
cc80 
Lon Rodney Kump 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent M. Winterholler 
James M. Elegante 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Pearson Enterprises 
185 South State Street 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Dorothy C. Pleshe 
Attorney for Plaintiff Utah Hotel Company 
Kennecott Building, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
I W ^ y^. 
Approved as to form. 
r7^^<£^C^ i^ Lyb 
X&& //A* 
\^^\y^Q^lioh 
-3-
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MEMORANDUM DECISION OF FEBRUARY 14, 1986 (R-1135) 
ba -ake County Utah" 
FEB 141986 
H. Dixo^Hindiey, Clerk 3rd Dist. Court 
T
 0 ^Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs< 
SALT LAKE CITY, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-82-5220 
The matter pending before the Court in the above-referenced 
proceeding is the defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion 
for a Protective Order, wherein the City seeks to relieve a 
third party, Utah Power and Light, from the obligation to respond 
to a Subpoena Duces Tecum, dated July 11, 1985, issued and served 
at the request of the plaintiff. The matter of the type of 
discovery sought by the proposed inquiry directed at Utah Power 
and Light has been before the Court on at least two prior occasions. 
On those prior occasions the Court has refused to allow the 
inquiry, and has granted the protective relief sought, or on 
the last occasion, has refused to reconsider a prior Order. 
At the latest hearing, all interested parties appeared and argued 
their respective positions. It was clear to the Court that 
the Court's prior rulings regarding the defendant City's Motions 
for Summary Judgment are not clear as to what issues remain 
for determination in this suit. Accordingly, the Court directed 
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counsel to set forth their positions as to the breadth of the 
Court's prior rulings on the City's Motions for Summary Judgment 
regarding the remaining issues, in letter form. The parties 
have done that, and the Court has reviewed those materials. 
The Court was hopeful that the capsulized versions in the afore-
mentioned letter briefs would allow the Court to re-evaluate 
the issues and resolve the questions regarding the remaining 
issues for trial determination without the necessity of reviewing 
all the prior Memoranda in the prior extensive files that led 
up to this Court's Order dealing with the plaintiff's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment which were denied, and the defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment which was granted in part and denied 
in part. Unfortunately, such was not the case, and to adequately 
advise itself regarding the reasons and basis, and more particularly 
the scope and breadth of the Court's rulings regarding remaining 
issues the Court has again reviewed the materials submitted 
in this case by all parties. Having accomplished that task, 
and having taken into account the arguments of the parties, 
the Court makes the following Memorandum Decision. 
As to the position of the parties as to the scope and breadth 
of the Court's ruling on the defendant City's Motions for Summary 
Judgment, the position asserted by Salt Lake City is correct. 
Whether or not the benefits received by the plaintiff from the 
defendant bears any relationship to the taxes paid is not an 
* s '*£ 
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issue that remains for determination. The Court's prior rulings 
on the defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment encompassed such 
a claim, and by this Memorandum any ambiguity contained in either 
the Memorandum Decision or the subsequent Order signed by the 
Court is resolved. The only remaining issue is whether or not 
the tax classification in question is arbitrary and/or discriminatory 
as applied. 
Based upon the foregoing clarification of the Court's prior 
Orders, the information sought from non-party Utah Power and 
Light to which the defendant City objects and seeks a protective 
order is not material nor relevant to the remaining issues, 
and therefore the protective order sought by the City should 
be granted. 
Counsel for the City is requested to pdrepare an appropriate 
Order which encompasses not only this/Court's ruling on the 
requested protective order, but specifically identifies in accordance 
with the foregoing discussions the issue remaining for determination. 
dav of February 1/8 6. Dated this y= _d y ary 
?IMOTHYNR. HANSON 
/DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
3y' 
H. OJXO HtNCtSY 
tCC^^-c 
'240vt. Zuv*. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this_ .day of February, 198 6: 
Lon Rodney Kump 
David J. Bird 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
333 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger F. Cutler 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants 
100 City & County Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John Fellows 
800 Kennecott Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Kent M. Winterholler 
185 S. State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul H. Proctor 
Attorneys for Utah Power and Light 
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 340 
P. O. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
coigns 
APPENDIX IV 
ORDER CLARIFYING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND GRANTING PROTECTIVE ORDER (R-1141) 
' i jbniVS i ^ L * / 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
MAY 2 8 1986 
H. OixonHindley. Cler*r3cd Dist. Court 
By ROGER F . CUTLER, USB No- 791 
S a l t Lake C i t y A t t o r n e y 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t s 
100 C i t y & C o u n t y B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U tah 8 4 1 1 1 
T e l e p h o n e : 5 3 5 - 7 7 8 8 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
Deputy Clerk 
/ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL 
CORPORATION, 
c o r p o r a t i o n , 
v s . 
a U t a h : 
P l a i n t i f f , : 
SALT LAKE CITY, e t a l . , : 
D e f e n d a n t s . : 
ORDER CLARIFYING 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND GRANTING PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
C i v i l No. C-82-522 0 
(Timothy R. Hanson) 
S a l t Lake C i t y ' s Motion fo r a P r o t e c t i v e Order of J u l y 3 0 , 
1985, c o n c e r n i n g a Subpoena Duces Tecum s e r v e d on Utah Power and 
Ligh t came on r e g u l a r l y fo r h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson on August 12, 1985. The i s s u e s r e g a r d i n g s a i d mot ion 
t u r n e d on t h e i s s u e s remain ing fo r t r i a l f o l l o w i n g t h e C o u r t ' s 
g r a n t i n g of t h e C i t y ' s Motion f o r P a r t i a l Summary Judgment on 
December 20 , 1983; t h e r e f o r e , t h e Cour t r ev iewed t h e memorandums 
and s u b m i t t a l s of t h e p a r t i e s , h e a r d o r a l argument and a g a i n 
r ev i ewed t h e m a t t e r s h e r e t o f o r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e Court i n s u p p o r t 
of t h e o r i g i n a l mot ions f o r summary j u d g m e n t . 
^ *
 r 
The Court having reviewed all such matters and being fully 
advised in the premises and having entered a Memorandum Decision 
regarding said matter on February 13, 1986, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The City !s Motion for a Protective Order concerning a 
certain subpoena duces tecum dated on or about July 11, 198 5, 
directed against Utah Power & Light, should be and the same is 
hereby granted. Said subpoena is quashed and Utah Power & Light 
is relieved of any obligation to respond thereto. 
2. The Partial Summary Judgment heretofore entered by the 
Court is hereby clarified to aid the parties in conducting 
further discovery and trial preparation. The scope and intent of 
the previous Partial Summary Judgment was to dismiss all claims, 
assertions and legal theories advanced by the plaintiff, as a 
matter of law, excepting only the issue of whether the tax 
classification selected by Salt Lake City Corporation was 
arbitrary and/or discriminatory as applied. The matter left for 
trial or further proceeding in the within case does not include a 
comparison of the public service benefits received by the plain-
tiff (s), or other innkeepers subject to the ordinance challenged 
by plaintiffs in the within litigation, from the City in relation 
to taxes paid by them. Thus, any further discovery from Utah 
Power & Light Company or other utility companies regarding the 
amount of tax paid by said utility companies to the City, attri-
butable to the payments made by the plaintiff, is irrelevant, 
-2-
immaterial and not subject to further discovery. Further, 
whether or not benefits received by plaintiff from Salt Lake City 
bear any relationship to the amount of taxes paid by plaintiff is 
not an issue remaining for determination in £ftis case. 
DATED this £ Y day of RprJrLfflSZS. 
BY THE/COURT: 
'IMtfTHY^R. HANSON 
'DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ATTEST 
H. D1XQN HINDLEY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING <g^A~) /JL^^S^ / 
By 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of Deoun Oier 
the foregoing Order Clarifying Partial Summary Judgment and 
Granting Protective Order to the below-listed parties by 
depositing same in the U.S. mail with postage prepaid thereon 
this ^'^<(3ay of April, 198 6: 
Lon Rodney Kump 
David J. Bird 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
333 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John Fellows 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Kent M. Winterholler 
185 S. State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-3-
 m *~ 
Paul H. P r o c t o r 
A t t o r n e y fo r Utah Power & L i g h t 
1407 W. North Temple, S u i t e 340 
P .O. Box 899 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 " " ~? 
cml31 
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APPENDIX V 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION'S ANSWERS TO 
DEFENDANT'S THIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (R-1207) 
CAT; /^  
David J. Bird (#0224 
i» RICHARDS/ BIRD Or .\L.V.." 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Teiechcne: (301) 328-3937 
C " 7 m 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORA-
TION/ a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utahr 
Defendant. 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL 
CORPORATION'S ANSWERS 
TO DEFENDANT'S THIRD 
SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. C-82-5220 
Judge Timothy R. Hansen 
H 
Little America Hotel Corporation answers Defendant's 
Third Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents 
as follows: 
Interrocatory No. 1: Please state in full detail ailj 
information tending to support or deny that the Ordinances establish j 
a tax classification that is "arbitrary, lacking a rational basis, •; 
and/or discriminatory as aoDlied." i 
! 
ANSWER NO. 1: Plaintiff LAHCO objects to this interrogatory ! 
because the portion of the interrogatory in quotation marks does i 
net property reflect the issue remaining for determination as
 : 
stated in the Court's Memorandum Decision of February 13 , 1986; 
'J 
> If 
y 
or in its Order Clarifying Partial Summary Judgment and Granting-
Protective Order dated May 28, 1986, which states that the issue1 
remaining for determination is "whether the tax classification. 
was arbitrary and/or discriminatory as applied." Because of 
j 
this objection, Interrogatory No. 1 will be treated as seeking; 
information en the issue as stated in the CourtTs Order, 
The Court's Order dated May 28, 19 8 6 states that: 
the matter left for trial . . .does not include 
a comparison of the public service benefits 
received by the plaintiff (s ) , or other innkeepers 
subject to the ordinance challenged by plaintiffs 
in the within litigation, from the city in 
relation to taxes paid by them. 
LAECO and its counsel are uncertain of the breadth 
of the Court's ruling. LAECO has no p y ^ ^ ^ a ^v„- -*-n »»»n; nn-r-o 
has b^^r arbitrarily applied or discriminatorily applied, with 
the understanding that those terms mean that the ordinance was 
applied to LAECO and not other members of the class subject to) 
the tax imposed by the ordinance. But the Order of May 28, 1986 
— — — j 
can be read to reserve the issue of whether the ordinance itself! 
I 
is arbitrary. For that reason, and on the issue of whether the. 
! 
ordinance is arbitrary, olaintiff intends at trial to proffer; 
I 
evidence through its expert, Merrill Norman, whose a:::dav:tsi 
!i have previously been submitted, as to the tax burden imposed! 
'!' I 
j! upon Little America Hotel and its customers in comparison with: 
i . 
\ those imDCsed en averace residents of Salt Lake Citv or the owners' 
! 
of other commercial property in the downtown area. Little America! 
*>! J * 
1 3 I 
il Hotel Corpora t ion w i l l a l so p rof fe r evidence, from Mr. Kenneth; 
ii * — — 
I i 
I Y. Knight, and Mike Fletcher regarding the lack of any demand: 
II for city services bv hotels and betels different, frcn these cf: 
| ether residents and/cr commercial properties. Also, records! 
jl cf the Salt Lake City Police Department and Fire Department are; 
I prepared yearly on police calls and fire calls in various four: 
I block square sections cf Salt Lake City. These will be used 
as evidence that hotels and motels do not create special demands 
en the fire department or police department. Some cf this information 
is contained in the unification studv dated Octoberr 1978 and 
jl prepared by the Salt Lake City Police Department and Salt Lake 
County Sheriffs1 Offices. 
Other information relevant to the determination of 
the arbitrariness of the ordinance include the minutes and transcripts 
of the Salt Lake City Council Meetings, which were Exhibits "3" 
land "C" to the Second Affidavit of Kathryn Marshall and were 
Exhibits rt2-A" through "2-D" of Salt Lake City Corporation's 
I Answers to Plaintiff LAHCO's First Set of Interrogatories (hereinafter | 
jj "City's Answers"). Also the documents considered by or referred 
ito by the City Council during its consideration of the ordinance, j 
I including the letter from Michael Fletcher, City's Answers Exhibit! 
||"2~G", the Hotel Motel Fact Sheet, Citv's Answers Exhibit "2-H",i 
i! 
Ijthe original draft of the ordinance, City's Answers Exhibit "2-1", 
the Impact Statement, City's Answers Exhibit "2-J", The Innkeeper 
L i c e n s e Tax a s an A l t e r n a t i v e R e v e n u e S o u r c e , C i t y ' s Answer: 
E x h i b i t "4 -G" , Mike F l e t c h e r ! s R e p o r t , E x h i b i t "4-H" , Al Ha ines 
i 
Report of Objections, Cityfs Answers Exhibit "4-1", the report 
i 
of the Blue Ribbon Committee, Cityrs Answers Exhibit "4-J". 
Also, records of budget expenditures, City's Answers Exhibits 
"10-A", "ii-A", "11-3", "il-C", "ll-Dn, and "11-E", records of 
the department budgets for the police, fire, park and recreation,} 
and public works departments, City's Answers Exhibits "13-A"! 
through "33-A", Public Works Departmentfs records of man hours! 
spend by sub-categories, City's Answers Exhibit "37-A". This 
information will show thar. the classification of innkeepers asi 
subject to the special tax was net justified by any factual basis 
or distinction in any wav related to the ouriDoses of the ordinance* 
The information will show that singling out innkeepers for the; 
tax was arbitrary and was created only for the purposes of balancingj 
the budget, avoiding raising property tax levels, and to make 
uo for a short-fail resulting from the invalidity of the Citvfsi 
; .. . .,. . . .. .1 
f r a n c m s e t a x e s a g a i n s t u t i l i t i e s , ana n o t r o r any r e a s o n wmcn» 
I 
would justify separate taxation of innkeeoers as a revenue source. 
i 
i 
P l a i n t i f f i s a w a r e , t h r o u g h d e f e n d a n t ' s p r e v i o u s s u b m i t t a l ! 
i 
of a f f i d a v i t s , of t h e c o n t e n t i o n of S a l t Lake C i t y t h a t p o l i c e ; 
and f i r e d e p a r t m e n t s a r e d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y impac ted by i n n k e e p e r s . 
i 
c o m p a r e d t o o t h e r b u s i n e s s e s o r r e s i d e n t s s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d . 1 
i 
I f s u c h t e s t i m o n y i s i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l , LAECO w i l l i n t r o d u c e 
I 
I 
I 
» 
5 : 
evidence to dispute those claims, including previously identified 
records of yearly calls, the National Standards for ?_ire 'Pr^^^^^icn r: 
and ^ n r n njr H ° ^  "* - —— "^~* ^ *- : ^ ^ ac -' c ^ oo^o^ ,3r,r.rj^r.i^r^—*>©-—distUte 
the. ciaims_r:f->-£aJJi-^^-ia--^i-c-y-L5-~witnesses . 
Plaintiff has nor yet deposed the members of the City 
. . . . . . . , , . i 
Council a t t.ie tinie m e orca.nan.es was cassea, out reserves trie1 
I 
right to call those members as witnesses to supply further information! 
regarding the consideration of the ordinance by the Salt Lake! 
City Council* 
Interrocatory No, 2: Identify the origin or sourcej 
of the information offered in response to Interrogatory No. 1 
above. For each source or person identified, please describe! 
their relationship to the parties in this case and their full 
name, address, and telephone number as specified previously in! 
Section I, "Preliminary Statement" above. Please include a detailed! 
description of the qualifications and background any such source*, 
or person. 
ANS AH£R NO. 2 : Refer to Answer to Interrogatory No. 1. j 
Interrocatory No. 3: Please state the name, address, 
I 
and telephone number of each and everv witness tlaintiff still! 
I 
intends to call to testify in any further proceedings regarding: 
I 
resolution of the remaining issue in this litigation. Include1 
in that answer: 
i 
I I 
t 
t 
6 : 
(a) A summary of t h e t e s t i m o n y expec-ed t c be 
! 
I 
elicitedr and ; j 
(b) An identification of each and every exhibit: 
which will be utilized by said witness, including a 
brief summarv of the exhibit and its contents. j 
I 
(c) A detailed description or the qualifications; 
and educational background of any proposed expert witness*! 
(d) The factual basis for any expert opinion! 
expected to be introduced. 
ANSWER NO. 3: 
I* Kenneth Y. Knight 
550 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
363-5100 
(a) Testimony regarding the taxes paid or collected! 
by Little America Hotel Corporation, the services provided! 
by Little America Eotel Corporation which are provided! 
by Salt Lake City free of charge to others. Payments! 
i 
actually made bv Little America Eotel Corooration Dursuant, 
I 
to the tax established by the ordinance. \ 
(b) Exhibits: No exhibits have been identified 
i 
i 
or prepared for introduction through Mr. Knight, but 
I 
mav include accounting records relating to the suspects 
j 
of his testimony. | 
(c) Not applicable. , 
(d) Net aoolicable. I 
II. Merrill Norman ! 
KMG Main-Eurdxrtan J 
4th Floor Kennecott Building | 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 ! 
(a) See Affidavits of Merrill Norman previously 
submitted and description of testimony in Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 1, above. i 
(b) See Exhibits to Affidavits previously submitted.! 
Otherwise, plaintiff has not yet determined what exhibits 
will be entered through he use of Mr. Norman. 
(c) See Affidavit of Merrill Norman. 
(d) See Affidavit of Merrill Norman. 
Plaintiff LAECO has not yet determined whether to call 
as witnesses surviving members of the City Council at the time! 
the ordinance was passed—Sydney Fonnesbeck, Palmer DePaulis, 
Alice Shearer, Ron Whitehead, and Grant Maybey, or Al Eaines, 
former administrator with Salt Lake City. They would testify 
as to their knowledge of the matters considered by and deliberations 
of the City Council. 
Plaintiff may also call representatives of the Salt 
Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau with regard to the 
information in the possession of that body about tourists, the 
amount of money they spend in Salt Lake City, the length of their 
| stay, their impact on public revenues, and their use of public 
benefits. 
s 
I 
I 
Plaintiff may call Jack Ciscn of the Utah Tax Payers 
Association, 1309 Wilson Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utahf regarding 
the basis and reasons for his comments to the City Council with 
regard to this ordinance. Other witnesses may include a recre-
i 
seriwarive of the Utah Sta te Universi ty I n s t i t u t e of Outdoor Recreation 
and Tourism rega rd ing s t u d i e s oerformed by tha t i n s t i t u t e and 
I 
their results* While plaintiff LAHCO has net finalized its triall 
preparations, these are the witnesses currently anticipated to| 
appear or who may appear as plaintiffTs witnesses during it case 
in chief. 
Interrocatory No. 4: Please state the name, address, 
telephone number, and position with the plaintiff of the person! 
answering these Interrogatories. 
ANSWER NO. 4: Because the Interrogatories asked byj 
defendant Salt Lake City seek information uniquely in the possession 
of its counsel, these Interrogatories have been prepared by David 
J. Bird of Richards, Bird & Kumo, 333 East Fourth South, Salt: 
I 
Lake City, Utah 84111, 328-8987, who has signed them in his capacity 
as attorney for plaintiff. 
DATED this /7' day of V C T^b^T , 1986 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP r2r~s/y- ^?s67>/ 
Davie J. Bira 
rneys for 
Eotel Corporation 
Attornev Little America 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
\r%^ C\ * > On rhe / r* day cf Ufl^J^_> , 1985, personal ly 
appeared before me DAVID J . 3I3.D, who by me being f i r s t dulv: 
sworn t n a t he i s the person who signed tne foregoing document: 
and t h a t the s t a tements contained there in are t rue to the best; 
of h i s knowledge. 
My Commission Expires: ( JtfJlJ.uTflj /? WttyfajL&} 
SI*.:, irs i*<*n - '. J N 0 T A ^ ? u ^ 7 ? / IfiJif ZD M9^ Residing a t Saltdl/ake County, Utah! 
"77 
CERTIFICATE OF, SERVICE ^ 
This certifies that on the )r& day of Uzid/Jth) , 
1986, I served the foregoing LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION'S 
ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT'S THIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS by mailing true and correct copies 
hereof,- postage prepaid, addressed to: j 
Roger F. Cutler, Esq. 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
100 City & County Building 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
• t JO 
. * < ^ 
- < * . +? 
ROGER F . CUTLER #791 
S a l t Lake C i t y A t t o r n e y 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t 
324 S o u t h S t a t e , 5 t h F l o o r 
S a l t Lake C i t v , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
T e l e p h o n e : (301) 5 3 5 - 7 7 3 3 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL ) 
CORPORATION, a U t a h ) AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER F . CUTLER 
c o r p o r a t i o n , e t a l . , ) 
) C i v i l No. C - 8 2 - 5 2 2 0 
P l a i n t i f f , ) J u d g e T i m o t h y R. Hanson 
v s . ) 
SALT LAKE CITY, a ) 
m u n i c i p a l c o r p o r a t i o n ) 
o f t h e S t a t e of U t a h , ) 
D e f e n d a n t . ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
County of S a l t Lake) 
ROGER F. CUTLER, A t t o r n e y f o r Defendan t S a l t Lake C i ty 
C o r p o r a t i o n , having been f i r s t du ly sworn upon o a t h , deposes and 
s a y s : 
1. The a t t a c h e d l e t t e r da t ed October 2 1 , 1936 was w r i t t e n 
a s an o b j e c t i o n to P l a i n t i f f ' s Answers to D e f e n d a n t ' s Third Se t 
o f I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , a sk ing t h a t LAHCO amend i t s answer to f u l l y 
r e spond to I n t e r r o g a t o r y No. 1 , i f any i n f o r m a t i o n was in t h e i r 
p o s s e s s i o n w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e q u e s t i o n a s a s k e d . 
2. The a t t a c h e d l e t t e r , d a t e d O c t o b e r 3 0 , 1 9 8 6 , was 
r e c e i v e d from P l a i n t i f f LAKCO i n r e s p o n s e t o A f f i a n t ' s l e t t e r of 
O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1 9 8 6 . 
DATED t h i s <• day o f M a r c h , 1 9 8 7 . 
~-> 
'^ROGER/F. CUTLER, A f f i a n t 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b ^ ^ T S e ? ^ i s l c ^ - d a y o f M a r c h , 
— ^ ^ * * . ~ ~ ^ 
198 7. §fgr \ £ % 
\^jqi^r%PC8LICr residing in 
'^sSJZpLg&t' County, Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby ce r t i fy t h a t I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Roger F. Cutler to David J. Bird, RICHARDS, BIRD & 
KUMP, Attorney for P la in t i f f , 333 East 4th South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111; John Fellows and Dorothy C. Pleshe, 800 Kennecott 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133; and to Kent M. 
Winterhol ler , 185 South State S t ree t , Suite 700, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 by depositing the same in the U.S. mail , postage 
prepaid, t h i s day of March, 198 7. 
ccl36 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
CITY ATTORNEY 
CHERYL D. LUKE 
CITY PROSECUTOR 
OTE® (SLUT QiMQMLQf 
LAW DEPARTMENT 
ICO CITY A N D COUNTY BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
(801) 525 -7788 
October 21, 1986 
D a v i d J . B i r d , E s q . 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
333 E a s t F o u r t h S o u t h 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS 
RAY L. MONTGOMERY 
GREG R. HAWKINS 
JUDY F. LEVER 
LARRY V. SPENDLOVE 
STEVEN W. ALLRED 
BRUCE R. 3AIRD 
FRANK M. NAKAMURA 
ASSISTANT PROSECUTORS 
JOHN N. SPIKES 
DONALD L. GEORGE 
ARTHUR L KEESLER. JR. 
CECELIA M. ESPENCZA 
Re J L i t t l e A m e r i c a v . SLC 
D e a r D a v e : 
I am i n r e c e i p t o f y o u r a n s w e r s t o o u r t h i r d s e t o f 
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , b u t o b j e c t t o y o u r r e p h r a s i n g my q u e s t i o n 
o n t h e p r e m i s e t h a t my i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s m u s t b e l i m i t e d by 
t h e l a n g u a g e of a C o u r t O r d e r o r by y o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
t h a t O r d e r . 
I h e r e b y r e q u e s t t h a t you amend y o u r a n s w e r t o f u l l y 
r e s p o n d t o I n t e r r o g a t o r y No. 1 , i f a n y a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a -
t i o n i s i n y o u r p o s s e s s i o n w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e q u e s t i o n a s 
a s ked . 
In a d d i t i o n , I o b j e c t t o t h e v a g u e a n s w e r on p a g e 5 
s u g g e s t i n a t h a t you w i l l p r o d u c e s u c h o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n a s 
deemed a p p r o p r i a t e t o d i s p u t e . If you h a v e any s u c h i n f o r a -
t i o n , we r e q u i r e t h a t i t b e d i s c l o s e d . I f t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n 
i s n o t now i n your p o s s e s s i o n , we w i l l e x p e c t t h a t , p u r s u a n t 
t o t h e r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e , you w i l l make i t a v a i l a b l e a s an 
a m e n d m e n t to t h e s e a n s w e r s a s s o o n a s i t i s a v a i l a b l e . In 
a n y e v e n t , a t t h i s d a t e , we n e e d an a f f i r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t a s 
t o w h e t h e r any a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n i s i n y o u r p o s s e s s i o n 
upon which you i n t e n d t o r e l y . 
T h i s l e t t e r i s w r i t t e n in l i e u o f mak ing f o r m a l o b j e c -
t i o n p u r s u a n t t o t h e new r u l e s wh ich r e q u i r e ccmmun i c a t i on 
b e t w e e n c o u n s e l . I w o u l d a o o r e c i a t e an amendment t o vour 
.**. 
David J . B i r d , Esq. 
Oc tobe r 2 1 , 1986 
Page - 2 -
answer s w i t h i n ten days t o avoid the n e c e s s i t y of fur the i 
c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s in t h i s m a t t e r . 
S i n c e r e l y , / 
(JROGER^T CUTLER 
^ C i t y A t t o r n e y 
RFC:cml4 8 
•V-
LYNN 5. RICHARDS 
RICHARD L 3IRD.JR. 
LON RCDNEY KiiM? 
JAMES M. RICHARDS 
STEVEN C. JOHNSON 
DAVID J BIRD 
LISA K. CLSEN 
LAW OFFICES OF 
R.ICHARDS. BiHD 8 K.UMP 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
333 EAST FOURTH SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH aam 
October 30, 1986 
Roger F. Cutler, Esq. 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
100 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TELEPHONE 328*8987 
AREA CODE aoi 
A £ C = | v E D 
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
DAT ^ •Mul £k 
Re: Little America Hotel Corporation vs. 
Lake City 
Salt 
Dear Roger: 
This letter is in response to yours of October 
21, 19 8 6 relating to the Answers to Interrogatories sent 
to you by mail on October 17, 1986. 
First, you dispute my objection to your first 
interrogatory, which adds the phrase "lacking in a rational 
basis" as one of the issues to be determined. I believe 
that the Court did limit the issues to those to which 
I have responded by the Answers to Interrogatories* 
AC££rdijig.1 y-T—T hplieyp that ^hp nhjpr-M'nn stated in the 
answers is we1T-^?,kQn. However, the only evidence we 
'have which would relate to the issue of whether the tax 
classification is lacking a rational basis is that stated 
in the Answers to Interrogatories, plus the tax information 
the Court has previously ruled was beyond the scope of 
discovery and was not admissible as evidence in the case. 
Second, you object to the portion of my answer 
at the top of page 5 of the Answers to Interrogatories* 
The purpose of this statement is merely to say that we 
intend to produce evidence to rebut testimony which you 
might produce during the trial. I have in my answers 
already anticipated the evidence you might put on in 
support of your position as best as I am able, and identified 
what evidence we would use to dispute that. But I am 
unable to say what testimony you might produce and what 
would be appropriate to rebut that testimony. Accordingly, 
I think it is impossible to give a more specific response. 
If you identify what specific evidence you will produce, 
I will identify how that will be rebutted, if at all. 
But I canft be held to be limited in my rebuttal by what 
I might now anticipate you producing at trail. Accordingly, 
I find it impossible to address your second objection 
to my answers. 
^C 
I hope that this clarifies my intentions ! v 
my Answers to Interrogatories. 
. Very truly yours, 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
/? 
David J. Bird 
DJB:lgh 
cc: Little America Hotel Corporation 
ROGER F . CUTLER #7 91 
S a l t Lake C i t y A t t o r n e y 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t 
324 S o u t h S t a t e , 5 t h F l o o r 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 801 ) 5 3 5 - 7 7 8 8 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA 
CORPO RATION, a 
c o r p o r a t i o n , e t 
HOTEL ) 
U t a h ) 
a l . , ) 
P l a i n t i f f , ) 
v s . 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
m u n i c i p a l c o r p o 
o f t h e S t a t e of 
a ) 
r a t i o n ) 
U t a h , ) 
D e f e n d a n t , ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN KATTER 
C i v i l No. C - 8 2 - 5 2 2 0 
J u d g e T i m o t h y R. H a n s o n 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
C o u n t y of S a l t Lake) 
JOHN KATTER, h a v i n g b e e n f i r s t d u l y s w o r n upon o a t h , d e p o s e s 
and s a y s : 
1 . He i s a du ly a p p o i n t e d s u p e r v i s o r of t he S a l t Lake C i t y 
B u s i n e s s L i cense Depa r tmen t . 
2. A l l i n n k e e p e r s w i t h i n the scope of S a l t Lake C i t y ! s 
B u s i n e s s Revenue Tax Ord inance a r e e q u a l l y taxed a c c o r d i n g to t h e 
s c h e d u l e s e t f o r t h in t h a t o r d i n a n c e . Each i s r e q u i r e d to pay 
upon p e n a l t y of r e v o c a t i o n of t h e i r b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e , t he 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d t a x . To a f f i a n t ' s b e s t knowledge a l l 
w i t h i n t h e t a x i n g c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a r e paying the t a x . Any who do 
n o t t i m e l y pay a r e i d e n t i f i e d and c o l l e c t i o n measures v i g o r o u s l y 
p u r s u e d to the e x t e n t l e g a l l y p e r m i t t e d . 
3. To a f f i a n t ' s b e s t knowledge , a f t e r d i l i g e n t i n q u i r y , no 
t r a n s i e n t room p r o v i d e r w i t h i n the meaning of t h e o r d i n a n c e 
s u b j e c t of t h e above c a p t i o n e d l a w s u i t has no t been i d e n t i f i e d , 
i n c l u d e d i n t he tax l a w ' s a p p l i c a t i o n , and payment made. 
DATED t h i s day of March, 198 7. 
J^^/f^7^Z~ 
JOHN ^TTERV A f f i a n t 
J-L_ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s V^— day of March, 
1987 . 
My Commission E x p i r e s 
r U , -
NOTARY PUBLIC, r e s i d i n g i n 
S a l t Lake County, Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I mai led a copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g 
A f f i d a v i t of John K a t t e r to David J . B i r d , RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP, 
A t t o r n e y for P l a i n t i f f , 333 Eas t 4th Sou th , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
84111; John Fe l lows and Dorothy C. P l e s h e , 800 K e n n e c o t t 
B u i l d i n g , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84133 ; and to Kent M. 
W i n t e r - h o l l e r , 185 Sou th S t a t e S t r e e t , S u i t e 700 , S a l t Lake C i t y , 
Utah 8 4 1 1 1 , by d e p o s i t i n g t he same in t h e U . S . m a i l , p o s t a g e 
p r e p a i d , t h i s day of , 1987 . 
c c l 3 6 
APPENDIX 
MINUTE ENTRY (R-1291) 
Mmute Book Form 103 1 0 1 1 
County of Salt Lake - State of UtarCU *£ ! r m 
LITTLE AMERICA CORPORATION. ET AL 
Plaintiff 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION o A b & N 0 : 
Defendant 
Type of hearing: Div Annul Supp. Order OSC. Other-
Present: Pltf Deft. \ Summons Stipulation 
P.Atty: DAVTT) J . BTRD Cfi J Waiver Publication 
D. Atty: ROGER F. CUTLER ( pj r j Default of Pltf/Deft Entered 
Sworn & Examined: -~^L<^^^ ^ei^-CO^J Date: MAY 1 8 , 1987 
Pltf- Deft- Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Others: clerk: E . THOMPSON 
SJ 
Reporter: ~~/ry^>t^yu^ ~?yU^<-*^e^zs*^ss^ 
Bailiff- J . XlRSMAN / ( il :
ORDERS: 
• Custody Evaluation Ordered D Custody Awarded To 
• Visitation Rights 
n 
• 
n 
• 
n 
Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:. 
Atty. fees to the 
Home To: 
= 
__ Per Month/Year 
_ in the amount of _ 
Per Month 
• Alimony Waived 
• Deferred 
D Furnishings To: Automobile To: 
• Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
• Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
• Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
• Restraining Order Entered Against. 
• Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $ 
• 90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
1] Divorce Granted To As 
• Decree To Become Final: • Upon Entry • 3-Month Interlocutory 
• Former Name of Is Rest 
• Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, < 
orders / shall issue for Deft. 
Returnable Bail 
• Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing thei 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
Based on wntt'tfn stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff o oouncolr court orders /TZ/J^ 
-PrGi 
APPENDIX VII 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R-1296) 
ROGER F . CUTLER #0 7 91 
S a l t Lake C i t y A t t o r n e y 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t s 
100 C i t y & Coun ty B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
T e l e p h o n e : 5 3 5 - 7 7 8 8 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JUL - 7 1987 
H Di: »nd,ey, Clerk 
By C ^ < ! ^ < ^ 
iStyQourt 
C'srK 
- ^ *, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL ) 
CORPORATION, a U t a h ) 
c o r p o r a t i o n , e t a l . , ) 
P l a i n t i f f s , ) 
v s . ) 
SALT LAKE CITY, e t a l . , ) 
D e f e n d a n t s . ) 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
C i v i l N o ^ C 8 2 - 5 2 2 0 
J u d g e TimotliT—fe—HanrTson 
C o n s o l i d a t i n g Case N o s . : 
C 8 2 - 5 2 2 0 , J u d g e Hanson 
C 8 2 - 5 5 8 6 , J u d g e H a n s o n 
C 8 2 - 7 5 1 1 , J u d g e H a n s o n 
C 8 3 - 5 5 7 7 , J u d g e F i s h i e r 
C 8 4 - 2 5 4 9, J u d g e R i g t r u p 
C 8 5 - 6 5 7 , J u d g e C o n d e r 
C 8 5 - 7 3 2 3 , J u d g e F i s h i e r 
C 8 6 - 5 8 0 9 , J u d g e H a n s o n 
C 8 7 - 2 8 8 8 , J u d g e R o k i c h 
The C o u r t e n t e r e d a P a r t i a l Summary J u d g m e n t o n o r a b o u t 
D e c e m b e r 2 0 , 1983 and c l a r i f i e d t h a t o r d e r i n an O r d e r C l a r i f y i n g 
P a r t i a l Summary J u d g m e n t and G r a n t i n g P r o t e c t i v e O r d e r , e n t e r e d 
o n o r a b o u t May 2 8 , 1 9 8 6 . A d d i t i o n a l d i s c o v e r y was u n d e r t a k e n 
and t h e d e f e n d a n t , S a l t Lake C i t y , moved f o r t o t a l Summary 
J u d g m e n t o n t h e r e m a i n i n g i s s u e s , w h i c h M o t i o n came o n r e g u l a r l y 
f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e C o u r t on Monday, May 1 8 , 1 9 8 7 . The 
d e f e n d a n t s w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e i r a t t o r n e y , R o g e r F. C u t l e r . 
The p l a i n t i f f , L i t t l e A m e r i c a H o t e l C o r p o r a t i o n , was r e p r e s e n t e d 
by i t s a t t o r n e y s Lon Rodney Kump and David J . B i r d . The H o t e l 
• o £ 
Utah was r e p r e s e n t e d by i t s a t t o r n e y , Russ K e a r l . The o t h e r 
p a r t i e s were not p r e s e n t o r r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l . The Cour t 
hav ing heard t he a r g u m e n t s of t h e c o u n s e l , hav ing read the 
memoranda and r e v i e w e d t h e m a t t e r s of r e c o r d and be ing f u l l y 
a d v i s e d in the p r e m i s e s ; 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDCES AND DECREES a s f o l l o w s : 
1. There i s no g e n u i n e m a t e r i a l i s s u e of f a c t and t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s a r e e n t i t l e d to and a r e h e r e b y awarded a Summary J u d g -
ment of d i s m i s s a l on a l l r e m a i n i n g i s s u e s of t h e c a s e . A l l 
c a u s e s of a c t i o n and c l a i m s shou ld be and t h e saijre a r e h e r e b y 
d i s m i s s e d , wi th p r e j u d i c e . 
2 . De fendan t s a r e awarded c o s t s . 
EftTED t h i s / day of gun*/, 1987< 
BY THE/COURT! 
EMtfTHY R. HANSON, Judge 
rv 
' U i ' / 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING* :- 11 ... 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I ma i l ed a copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g 
Summary Judgment to Lon Rodney Kump and David J . B i r d , RICHARDS, 
BIRD & KUMP, A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f , 333 E a s t 4th Sou th , S a l t 
Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1 ; Russ Kear l and Dorothy C. P l e s h e , 800 
K e n n e c o t t B u i l d i n g , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84133; and to Kent M. 
W i n t e r h o l l e r , 185 South S t a t e S t r e e t , S u i t e 700, S a l t Lake C i t y , 
the same 
u t a h 84111 by depos i t ing 
•A <-his ^ S ^ d a y of June , 1987. p repa id , t h i s rp^~^ . 
in the U.S. m a i l , postage 
K s j ^ . 
:cl4 6 
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APPENDIX VIII 
CHAPTER 3, TITLE 20 REVISED ORDINANCES 
OF SALT LAKE CITY (R-218) 
20-2-6-20-3-1 LICENSE AND BUSINESS REGULATION 
Sec. 20-2-6. Contract with State Tax Commission. Heretofore, this 
municipality has entered into an agreement with the State Tax Commission 
to perform all functions incident to the administration or operation of the 
sales and use tax ordinance of the municipality. That contract is hereby 
confirmed and the mayor is hereby authorized to enter into such 
supplementary agreement with the State Tax Commission as may be 
necessary to the continued administration and operation of the local sales 
and use tax ordinance of the municipality as re-enacted by this ordinance. 
Sec. 20-2-7. Penalties. Any person violating any of the provisions of this 
ordinance shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction 
thereof, shall be punishable by a fine in an amount less than $300.00 or 
imprisonment for a period of not more than six months, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment. 
Sec. 20-2-8. Severability. If any section, subsection, sentence, clause, 
phrase, or portion of this ordinance, including but not limited to any 
exemption is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by the 
decision of any court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect 
the validity of the remaining portions of this ordinance.
 BiH No> 4^ Mav20,1975 
Chapter 3 
BUSINESS REVENUE LICENSE 
Sections: 
20-3-1. Definitions. 
20-3-2. License fee levied. 
20-3-3. Unlawful to operate without license. 
20-3-4. License additional to all regulatory licenses. 
20-3-5. Delinquent date and penalty. 
20-3-6. Records to be maintained. 
20-3-7. Returns not to be public. 
20-3-8. Unlawful to file false return. 
20-3-9. Revocation of license. 
20-3-10. License fees declared to be a debt. 
20-3-11. Exemptions to license. 
20-3-12. Fee not to constitute undue burden on interstate commerce. 
20-3-12.1. Branch establishments. 
20-3-12.2. Joint license. 
20-3-12.3. Revenue measure. 
20-3-13. Separability clause. 
20-3-14. Utility revenue tax. 
20-3-14.1. Revenue tax on business in competition with public 
utilities. 
20-3-14.2. Commercial consumers of gas or electric energy. 
Sec. 20-3-1. Definition. For the purpose of this chapter the following 
terms shall have the meanings herein prescribed: 
Dec., 1975 
Nov., 1977 
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(1) Business. ' business' ' means and includes all activities engaged in 
within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City carried on for the business of 
gain or economic profit, except that the acts of employees rendering service 
to employers shall not be included in the term business unless otherwise 
specifically prescribed. 
(2) Engaging in Business. "Engaging in business'' includes but is not 
limited to, the sale of tangible personal property at retail or wholesale, the 
manufacturing of goods or property and the rendering of personal services 
for others for a consideration by persons engaged in any profession, trade, 
craft, business, occupation or other calling, except the rendering of per-
sonal services by an employee to his employer under any contract of per-
sonal employment. 
(3) Place of Business. "Place of business*' means each separate location 
maintained or operated by the licensee within Salt Lake City from which 
business activity is conducted or transacted. B,LL NO-60 —JUNE 23» *970 
(4) Employee. "Employee" means the operator, owner or manager of 
said place of business and any persons employed by such person in the 
operation of said place of business in any capacity and also any salesman, 
agent or independent contractor engaged in the operation of said place of 
business in any capacity. 
(5) Number of Employees. "Number of employees'' shall mean the 
average number of employees engaged in business at the place of business 
each regular working day during the preceding calendar year. In comput-
ing said number, each regular full-time employee shall be counted as one 
employee, and each part-time employee shall be counted as that fraction 
which is formed by using the total number of hours worked by such em-
ployee as the numerator and the total number of hours regularly worked by 
a full-time employee as the denominator. 
(6) Person. "Person" shall mean any individual, receiver, assignee, 
trustee in bankruptcy, trust, estate, firm, co-partnership, joint venture, 
club, company, joint stock company, business trust, corporation, association, 
society or other group of individuals acting as a unit, whether mutual, coop-
erative, fraternal, non-profit or otherwise. 
(7) Gross Sales. "Gross sales" shall not include: 
(a) The amount of any Federal tax, except excise taxes imposed upon 
or with respect to retail or wholesale sales, whether imposed upon the re-
tailer, wholesaler, jobber or upon the consumer and regardless of whether or 
not the amount of Federal tax is stated to customers as a separate charge; and 
Feb 1968 
April, 1976 
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(b) The amount of net Utah State Sales Tax. The term "gross sales" 
includes the amount of any manufacturer's or importer's excise tax in-
cluded in the price of the property sold, even though the manufacturer or 
importer is also the wholesaler or retailer thereof, and whether or not the 
amount of- such^tax Insta ted as a separate charge. 
(^\.fC- ) 
Sec. 20-3-ft<^Licence fcco loviod. (a) Thorp IG horoby levied upon the 
^business of every person engaged in business in Salt Lake City at a place of 
business within the city, an annual license fee of $40.00 per place of business, 
plW an additional fee of $4.00 for each and every employee, exceeding one, 
enaaged in the operation of said business, based upon the number of 
em/pioyees defined in Section 20-3-1; provided, however, that any such person 
may Veceive an exemption of $25.00 annually upon submitting an affidavit 
that nis gross sales of goods and/or services for the preceding calendar year 
were less than $10,000 at such place of business, and, further provided, that 
t)iere shall be a maximum fee of $1,500.00 for each place of business. 
Bill No. 60, June 23, 1970 
Bill No. 151, Dec. 10.1975 
(b) There is hereby levied upon every person engaged in business in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, not having a place of business in said city, and not 
exempt as provided by Sec. 20-3-11 of this chapter, a license fee based upon 
the percentage of gross sales and/or services made or performed within 
the city in relation to the total gross sales and/or services made or per-
formed from a place of business outside the corporate limits of Salt Lake 
City from which business within Salt Lake City is transacted and by apply-
ing such percentage to the fee which would otnerwise be assessed for such 
place of business were it located within the corporate limits of Salt Lake 
City. 
Sec. 20-3-3. Unlawful to operate without license. It shall be unlawful for 
any person to engage in business within Salt Lake City without first pro-
curing the license required by this chapter. 
Februory 6 , 1968 
Sec. 20-3-4. License additional to all regulatory licenses. The license fee 
imposed by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other taxes or li-
censes imposed by any other provisions of the ordinances of Salt Lake City. 
Sec. 20-3-5. Delinquent date and penalty. All license fees imposed by this 
chapter shall be due and payable on or before January 1, of any calendar 
year and in the event any fee is not paid on or before such date, a penalty 
shall be assessed pursuant to the provisions of 20-1-13 of this title, which 
penalty shall become part of the license fee imposed by this chapter. 
February, 1970 
Sec. 20-3-6. Records to be maintained. It shall be the duty of every 
person liable for the payment of any license fee imposed by this chapter 
Feb 1968 
Apr i l . 1976 
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SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 
No. 35 Of l tO (License Fees Lev»ed) 
AN ORDINANCE AMEND-
ING SECTION 20-3-2 OF THE 
REVISED ORDINANCES OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 
1965, RELATING TO L I -
CENSE FEES LEVIED 
Be rt ortlatfted by the City 
Council of Salt Lake City, Utah: 
SECTION 1 That Section 20-
3-2 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, be, 
and the same hereby is 
amended to read as follows. 
Sec 20-3-2 License fees 
levied (1) Fee for business 
located in Salt Lake City 
There is hereby levied upon 
the business of every person 
engaged in business in Salt 
Lake City at a place of busi-
ness within the city, an annu-
al license fee of S50 CM per 
place of business, plus an 
additional fee of $5 00 for each 
and every employee, exceed-
ing one, engaged in the opera-
tion of said business, based 
upon the number of employ-
ees defined in Section 20-3-1. 
(2) Exceptions, maximum 
fee and new businesss The 
foregoing notwithstanding, 
any such person taxed in 
subsection 1 above: (a) may receive an exemption 
of $25 00, annually, upon 
submitting an affidavit that 
the gross sales of goods 
and/or services for the 
preceding calendar year 
were less than $20,000 at 
such place of buiness, (b) shall pay a license fee of 
$25 00 for the first year, or 
part thereof, of operation of 
a new business (3) Fee for businesses locat-
ed outside Salt Lake City. 
There is hereby levied upon 
every person engaged in busi-
ness in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
not having a place of business 
in said city, and not exempt 
as provided by Sec. 20-3-11 of 
this chapter, a license fee 
based upon the percentage of 
gross sales and J or services 
made or performed from a 
place of business outside the 
corporate limits of Salt Lake 
City from which business 
within Salt Lake City is trans-
acted and by applying such 
percentage to the fee which 
would otherwise be assessed 
for such place of business 
were «t located within the 
corporate Iimtts of Salt Lake 
City 
SECTION 2. This ordinance 
shall take effect upon its first 
publication. 
Passed by the City Council 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
8th day of June, 1982. 
S. Fonnesbeck 
CHAIRMAN 
ATTEST 
Kathryn Marshall 
CITY RECORDER 
Transmitted to Mayor on 
June 15, 1982. 
Mayor's Action: June 15, 
1982 
Ted Wilson 
MAYOR 
ATTEST 
Kathryn Marshall 
CITY RECORDER (SEAL) 
BILL 35 of 1982 
Published, Deseret News 
6/28/82 
D-23 
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to keep and preserve for a period of three years such books and records as will 
accurately reflect the amount of his gross annual sales of goods and services 
for any year for which an exemption is claimed, and the number of employees 
and from which can be determined the amount of any license fee for which he 
may be liable under the provisions of this chapter. 
Sec. 20-3-7. Returns not to be public. Returns made to the license 
assessor or collector of Salt Lake City, as required by this chapter, shall not 
be made public nor shall they be subject to the inspection of any person except 
the city license assessor and collector or his authorized agent, or to those 
persons first authorized to do so by order of the board of commissioners. It 
shall be unlawful for any person to make public or to inform any other person 
as to the contents of any information contained in, or permit the inspection of 
any return, except as is in this section authorized. 
Sec. 20-3-8. Unlawful to file false return. It shall be unlawful for any 
person to make a return that is false knowing the same to be so. 
Sec. 20-3-9. Revocation of License. A license issued under the provisions 
of this Chapter may be revoked by the Board of City Commissioners after 
hearing of said Board, upon the Board's finding a violation of any provision or 
failure to comply fully with the provisions of this Chapter or any other City 
Ordinance. BILL NO 5. J«. u. u* 
Sec. 20-3-10. License fees declared to be a debt. Any license fee due and 
unpaid under this chapter and all penalties thereon shall constitute a debt to 
Salt Lake City and shall be collected by court proceedings in the same manner 
as any other debt in like amount, which remedy shall be in addition to all other 
existing remedies. 
Sec. 20-3-11. Exemptions to license, (a) No license fee shall be imposed 
under this chapter upon any person (1) engaged in business for solely 
religious, charitable, eleemosynary or other types of strictly non-profit 
purpose who is tax exempt in such activities under the laws of the United 
States and the State of Utah; (2) engaged in a business specifically exempted 
from municipal taxation and fees by the laws of the United States or the State 
of Utah; (3) engaged in a business operated under the supervision of the 
Division of Exposition of the Utah State Department of Development 
Services and located exclusively at the Utah State Fairgrounds during the 
. period of the annual Utah State Fair; or (4) not maintaining a place of business 
within Salt Lake City who has paid a like or similar license tax or fee to some 
other taxing unit within the State of Utah, and which taxing unit exempts 
from its license tax or fee, by reciprocal agreement or otherwise, businesses 
domiciled in Salt Lake City and doing business in such taxing unit. 
Bill No 16. Feb 5, 1976 
(b) Reciprocal agreement. The city license assessor and collector may, 
with approval of the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, enter into 
reciprocal agreements with the proper officials of other taxing units, 
Feb. 1967 
525 June' 1975 
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as may be deemed equitable and proper in effecting the exemption provided 
for in paragraph (a) of this section. 
Sec. 20-3-12. Fee not to constitute undue burden on interstate commerce. 
None of the license fees provided for by this chapter shall be applied as to 
occasion an undue burden on interstate commerce. In any case where a license 
fee is believed by a licensee or applicant for license to place an undue burden 
upon such commerce, he may apply to the license assessor and collector for an 
adjustment of the fee so that it shall not be discriminatory, unreasonable or 
unfair as to such commerce. Such application may be made before, at or 
within six months after payment of the prescribed license fee. The applicant 
shall, by affidavit and supporting testimony show his method of business and 
the gross volume or estimated gross volume of business and such other 
information as the license assessor and collector may deem necessary in order 
to determine the extent, if any, of such undue burden on such commerce. The 
license assessor and collector shall then conduct an investigation, comparing 
applicant's business with other businesses of like nature and shall make find-
ings of facts from which he shall determine whether the fee fixed by this 
chapter is discriminatory, unreasonable or unfair as to applicant's business 
and shall recommend to the board of commissioners a license fee for the appli-
cant in an amount that is nondiscriminatory, reasonable and fair, and if the 
board of commissioners is satisfied that such license fee is the amount that the 
applicant should pay, it shall fix the license fee in such amount. If the regular 
license fee has already been paid, the board of commissioners shall order a 
refund of the amount over and above the fee fixed by the board. In fixing the 
fee to be charged, the license assessor and collector shall have the power to 
base the fee upon a percentage of gross sales, or employees, or may use any 
other method which will assure that the fee assessed shall be uniform with 
that assessed on businesses of like nature; provided, however, that the 
amount assessed shall not exceed the fee prescribed in section 20-3-2. 
Sec. 20-3-12.1. Branch establishments. A separate license must be ob-
tained for each branch establishment or location of business engaged in, 
within the city, as if such branch establishment or location were a separate 
business and each license shall authorize the licensee to engage only in the 
business licensed thereby at the location or in the manner designated in such 
license, provided, that warehouses and distributing places used in connection 
with or incident to a business licensed under this ordinance shall not be 
deemed to be separate places of business or branch establishments. 
Sec. 20-3-12.2. Joint license. Whenever any person is engaged in two or 
more businesses at the same location within the city, such person shall not be 
required to obtain separate licenses for conducting each of such busi-
nesses, but shall be issued one license which shall specify on its face all 
such businesses. The license tax to be paid shall be computed as if all of 
Feb 1967 
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said businesses were one business being conducted at such location. Where 
two or more persons conduct separate businesses at the same location, each 
such person shall obtain a license for such business and pay the required 
license tax for such business. 
Sec. 20-3-12.3. Revenue measure. This ordinance is enacted solely to raise 
revenue for municipal purposes and is not a substitute for other regulatory or-
dinances. The foregoing notwithstanding, no revenue license may be issued for 
a business operation which, on the face of the license application, would be in 
violation of criminal laws or ordinances or where the place of business would 
be located in an area not zoned for such business activity. 
Sec. 20-3-13. Separability clause. If any subsection, sentence, clause, 
phrase or portion of this chapter, including but not limited to any exemption, 
is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by the decision of any 
court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity of 
the remaining portions of this chapter. The board of commissioners of Salt 
Lake City hereby declares that it would have adopted this chapter and each 
subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or portion thereof, irrespective of the fact 
that any one or more subsections, sentences, clauses, phrases, or portions 
thereof be declared invalid or unconstitutional. 
Sec. 20-3-14. Utility revenue tax. There is hereby levied upon the business 
of every person or company engaged in business in Salt Lake City, Utah, of 
supplying telephone, gas or electric energy service as public utilities, an an-
nual license tax equal to four percentum of the gross revenue derived from the 
sale and use of the services of said utilities delivered from and after January 1, 
1981, within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City, said fee being in addition 
to the two percent franchise fee. 
The term "gross revenue", as used herein, shall be construed to mean the 
revenue derived from the sale and use of public utility services within Salt 
Lake City, provided that "gross revenue'' as applied to the telephone utility 
shall be construed to mean basic local exchange services revenue received from 
subscribers located within Salt Lake City and directly connected with the 
switchboards of said utility located in the City. 
"Public utility services" shall mean the sale and use of electric power and 
energy, natural gas and local exchange telephone services. 
Within forty-five days after the close of each month in a calendar year, any 
public utility taxes hereunder shall file with the City Treasurer of Salt Lake 
City a report of its gross revenue derived from the sale and use of public utility 
service in Salt Lake City as defined herein, together with a computation of the 
526a 
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SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 
No. 2 Of 1982 (Utility Revenue Tax) 
AN ORDINANCE AMEND-
ING SECTION 20-3-14 OF 
THE REVISED ORDINANC-
ES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
UTAH, 1965. RELATING TO 
UTILITY REVENUE TAX. 
Be it ordained by the City 
Council of Salt Lake City, 
Utah: 
SECTION 1. That Section 20-
3-U of the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, be. 
and the same hereby is 
amended to read as follows: 
Sec. 20-3-14. Utility revenue 
tax. (1) There is hereby levied 
uoon the business of every 
person or company engaged 
In business in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, of supplying telephone, 
gas or electric energy service 
as public utilities, an annual 
license tax equal to four per-
centum of the gross revenue 
derived from the sale and use 
of the services of said utilities 
delivered from and after July 
1, 1980, within the corporate 
limits of Salt Lake City, said 
fee being in addition to the 
two percent franchise fee. 
(2) Definitions: (a) Gross revenue. "Gross 
revenue",, as used herein, 
shall be construed to mean 
the revenue derived from the 
sale and use of public utility 
services within Salt Lake 
City, provided that "gross 
revenue" as applied to the 
telephone utility shall be con-
strued to mean basic local 
exchange services revenue. (b) Basic local exchange 
service revenue. Basic local 
exchange service revenue as 
used herein shall mean reve-
nues received from the fur-
nishing of telecommunications 
within Salt Lake City and 
access to the telecommunica-
tions network to either busi-
ness, residential or other cus-
tomers wt)ett>er on a flat rate 
or measured basis, by means 
of an access line. Basic local 
exchange service revenues 
shall not include revenues 
obtained by the telephone 
public utility company from 
the provision of terminal tele-
phone equipment services (such as basic telephone sets. 
private branch exchanges and 
key telephone systems), or 
from other telephone equip-
ment which is obtainable from 
both the telephone company 
and other suppliers. (c) Public utility services. 
"Public utility services" as 
used herein shall mean the 
sale and use of electric power 
and energy, natural gas and 
basic local exchange tele-
phone service. (3) Remittance Date. Within 
forty-five days after the end of 
each month in a calendar 
year, the public utility taxed 
hereunder shall file with the 
city treasurer of Salt Lake 
City a report of its gross reve-
nue derived from the sale and 
use of public utility service in 
Salt Lake City as defined 
herein, together with a com-
putation of the tax levied 
hereunder against the utility. 
Coincidental with the filing of 
such report, the utility shall 
pay to Ihe city treasurer the 
amount of the tax due for that 
calendar month subiect to 
said reoort. 
SECTION 2. This ordinance 
shall become effective July 1, 
1982. 
Passed by the City Council 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
5th day of January, 1982. 
Sydney R. Fonnesbeck 
CHAIRAAAN 
ATTEST: 
Kathryn Marshall 
CITY RECORDER 
Transmitted to Mayor on 
1/11/82 
Mayor's Action: 
Ted Wilson 
MAYOR 
ATTEST: 
Kathryn Marshall 
CITY RECORDER 
cm 39 (SEAL) 
BILL 2 of 1982 
Published January 27,1982 
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tax levied hereunder against the utility. Coincidental with the filing of such 
report, the utility shall pay to the City Treasurer the amount of the tax. 
Apnl, 1968 
BiMNo 115. 1976 
B«M No. 36. 1977 
, Bill No 118. 1977 
\VV \ B»H No. 21. 1980 
a I lb ' Bill No. 74. 1980 
Sec. 20-3-14.1. Revenue tax on business in competition with public 
utilities. There is hereby levied upon the business of every person or company 
engaged in the business in Salt Lake City, Utah, of supplying telephone ser-
vice, gas or electric energy service in competition with public utilities, an 
annual licence tax equal to six percentum of the gross revenue derived from 
the sale and use of such competitive services delivered from and after 
November 1, 1977, within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City. 
"In competition and public utilities" shall mean to trade in products or 
services within the same market as a public utility taxed under section 14 of 
this chapter. 
Within forty-five days after the close of each month in a calendar year, any 
business taxed hereunder shall file with the city treasurer of Salt Lake City a 
report of its gross revenue derived from the sale and use of services specified 
hereunder rendered in competition with public utilities in Salt Lake City, 
together with a computation of the tax levied hereunder against such 
business. Coincidental with the filing of such report, the business shall pay to 
the city treasurer the amount of the tax. 
A 'tea-
Bill No. 119. 1977 
Bill No. 171, 1977 
tfcl 
Sec. 20-3-14.2. Commercial consumers of gas or electric energy. Any com-
mercial consumer of gas or electric energy which is engaged in business in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and which consumes gas or electric energy provided by a 
public utility subject to the utility revenue tax imposed by this section shall be 
entitled to a rebate of that portion of the combined utility revenue tax and two 
percent franchise fee which exceeds three-fourths of one percent of the gross 
sales of said commercial consumer. 
For the purposes of this subsection it shall be deemed that the amount 
paid by each qualifying commercial consumer to each subject public utility for 
gas or electric energy includes a payment of six percent utility revenue tax and 
a payment of two percent franchise fee. The term "gross sales" as used in this 
subsection, shall be defined consistent with the definition of that term as 
found in the Internal Revenue Code as of the effective date of this ordinance. 
Rebates shall be made on a yearly basis to coincide with the commercial 
consumer's taxable year as adopted for federal income tax purposes. Applica-
tion shall be made to the City Treasurer of Salt Lake City for the rebate 
provided herein no sooner than forty-five days and no later than four months 
after the close of the commercial consumer's taxable year. 
^.t 2l'?-l? V-P^ fv, IjCl^H^^LO \VAC £,1*2- B»H No. 132. 1977 
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SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 
No. 1 of 1982 
(Revenue Tax on Business in Competition 
with Public Utilities and Commercial 
Consumers of Gas or Electric Energy) 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTIONS 20-3-U.1 AND 
20-3-14.2 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE 
CITY, UTAH, 1965. RELATING TO REVENUE TAX ON 
BUSINESS IN COMPETITION WITH PUBLIC UTILITIES 
AND COMMERCIAL CONSUMERS OF GAS OR ELECTRIC 
ENERGY. 
Be it ordained by the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah: 
SECTION 1. That Sections 20-3-14.1 of the Revised Ordi-
nances of Salt Lake City, Utah, relating to revenue tax on 
business in competition with public utilities, be, and the same 
hereby is amended to read as follows: 
Sec. 20-3-14.1. (1) Revenue tax on business in competition 
with public utilities. There is hereby levied upon the business 
of every person or company engaged in the business in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, of supplying basic local exchange telephone 
service, as defined in Section 20-3-U of the Revised Ordinanc-
es of Salt Lake City, Utah, natural gas or electric energy ser-
vice in competition with public utilities, as annual license tax 
equal to four percentum of the gross revenue derived from the 
sale and use of such competitive services sold, used or deli-
vered within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City, after 
November 1, 1977. 
(2) Definitions. In Competition With Public Utilities. " In 
competition with public utilities" shall mean to trade in prod-
ucts or services within the same market as a public utility 
taxed under section 14 of this chapter. (3) Remuneration Date. Within forty-five days after the 
end of each month in a calendar year, any business taxed 
hereunder shall file with the city treasurer of Salt Lake City a 
report of its gross revenue derived from the sale and use of 
services specified hereunder rendered in competition with 
public utilities in Salt Lake City, together with a computation 
of the tax levied hereunder against such business. Coinciden-
tal with the filing of such report, the business shall pay to the 
city treasurer the amount of the tax due for the calendar 
month which is the subject of the said report. 
SECTION 2. That Section 20-3-U.2 of the Revised Ordi-
nances of Salt Lake City, Utah, relating to commercial con-
sumers of gas or electric energy, be, and the same hereby is 
amended to read as follows: 
Sec. 20-3-14.2. Commercial consumers of gas or electric 
energy. Any commercial consumer of gas or electric energy 
which is engaged in business in Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
which consumes natural gas or electric energy provided by a 
public utility subject to the utility revenue tax imposed by this 
section shall be entitled to a rebate of that portion of the 
combined utility revenue tax and two perent franchise fee 
which exceeds three-fourths of one percent of the gross sales 
of said commercial consumer. 
For the purposes of this subsection It shall be deemed that 
the amount paid by each qualifying commercial consumer to 
each subject public utility for natural gas or electric energy 
Includes a payment of six percent utility revenue tax and a 
payment of two percent franchise fee. The term "gross sales" 
as used in this subsection, shall be defined consistent with the 
definition of that term as found in the Internal Revenue Code 
effective for the consumer's taxable year during which a re-
bate is sought. 
Rebate shall be made on a yearly basis to coincide with 
the commercial consumer's taxable year, as adopted for fed-
eral income tax purpose. Application shall be made to the city 
treasurer of Salt Lake City for the rebate provided herein no 
sooner than forty-five days and no later than four months after 
the close of the commercial consumer's taxable year. 
SECTION 3. This ordinance shall become effective July 1, 
1982. 
Passed by the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
5th day of January, 1962. 
Sydney R. Fonnesbeck 
CHAIRMAN 
ATTEST: 
Kathryn Marshall 
CITY RECORDER 
Transmitted to Mayor on 1/11/82 
Mayor's Action: 
Ted Wilson 
MAYOR 
ATTEST: 
Kathryn Marshall 
CITY RECORDER 
cm 39 (SEAL) 
BILL 1 of 1982 
Published January 27,1982 
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SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 
No. 40 of l f t t (Innkeeper License Taxes) 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 3 OF T ITLE 20 
OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
UTAH. 1965, BY ADDING A NEW SECTION 15 RELATING 
TO INNKEEPER LICENSE TAX. 
Be it ordained by n>e City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah: 
SECTION 1. That Chapter 3 of Title 20 of the Revised Ordi-
nances of Salt Lake City, Utah, be, and the same hereby is 
amended by ADDING a new Section 15 thereto to read as fol-
lows: 
Sec. 20-3-15. Innkeeper license tax. (1) There is hereby levied upon the business of every per-
son, company, corporation, or other like and similar persons. 
groups or organizations, doing business in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, as motor courts, motels, hotels, inns or like and similar 
public accomodations, an annual license tax eoual to one per-
cent (1°A>) of the gross revenue derived from the rent for each 
and every occupancy of a suite, room or rooms, tor a period of 
less than thirty (30) days. 
(2) For purposes of this section, gross receipts shall be 
computed upon ttte base room rental rate. There shall be ex-
cluded from the gross revenue, by which this tax is measured: (a) The amount of any sales or use tax imposed by the 
State of Utah or by any other governmental agency upon a 
retailer or consumer; (b) The amount of any transcient room tax levied under 
authority of Chapter 31 of Title 17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended ; (c) Receipts from the sale or service charge for any 
food, beverage or room service charges in conjunction with 
the occupancy of the suite, room or rooms, not included in the 
base room rate; and (d) Charges made for supplying telephone service, gas 
or electrical energy service, not included in the base room 
rate. (3) Any person or business entity subject to the payment 
of taxes provided under subsection (1) of this section, shall be 
entitled to credit against the amount of taxes due thereunder, 
the amount of license taxes due the City under Sections 20-3-2 
and 20-15-3 of these ordinances. (4) The tax imposed by this section shall be due and pay-
able to the City Treasurer quarterly on or before the thirtieth 
day of the month next succeeding each calendar quarterly 
period, the first of such quarterly periods being the period 
commencing with the first day of July, 1982. Every person or 
business taxed hereunder shall on or before the thirtieth day 
of the month next succeeding each calendar quarterly period, 
file with the License Division a report of its gross revenue for 
the preceding quarterly period. The report shall be accompa-
nied by a remittance of the amount of tax due for the period 
covered by the report. 
The City may contract with the state tax commission to 
perform all functions incident to the administration and opera-
tion of this ordinance. 
SECTION 2. This ordinance shall become effective July 1, 
1982. No tax shall be due or accrue under this enactment prior 
to such effective date. 
Passed by the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
8th day of June, 1982. 
S. FONNESBECK 
CHAIRMAN 
ATTEST: 
KATHRYN MARSHALL 
CITY RECORDER 
Transmitted to Mayor on June 15,1982 
Mayor's Action: June 15,1982 
TED WILSON 
MAYOR 
ATTEST: 
KATHRYN MARSHALL 
CITY RECORDER (SEAL) 
BILL 40of 1982 
Published June 25,1982 
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APPENDIX IX 
OBJECTION TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
MERRILL R. NORMAN (R-870) 
niEo;:; CL«X'S '".-ICE 
S*LT *.'.*•*" •":••: VTY. UTAH 
Mm Z4 4 53 PM 'S3 
HrfilXON H"D. r - ;c iERK 
DEPUTY CLERU 
ROGER F . CUTLER 
S a l t L a k e C i t y A t t o r n e y 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t s 
100 C i t y & C o u n t y B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : 5 3 5 - 7 7 8 8 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL ) 
CORPORATION, et al., ) 
vs. 
SALT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
LAKE CITY, et al., ) 
Defendants. ) 
OBJECTION TO THE AFFIDAVIT 
OF MERRILL R. NORMAN 
Civil No. C 82-5220 
COMES NOW the defendant by and through its attorney, Roger 
F. Cutler, and objects to the Affidavit of Merrill R. Norman, in 
whole and in particular, on the grounds that it is irrelevant, 
immaterial, lacks foundation, asserts opinions on beliefs beyond 
the expertise of the witness, is based on hearsay and contains 
matters either not admissible or not yet admitted properly in 
evidence. Further, the Affidavit was not timely filed in 
accordance with Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the calendaring order of the Court, and, therefore, cannot be 
used to support motions for summary judgment by plaintiffs in 
this action. Among others, defendants specifically object as 
follows: 
1 . The affidavit on file in the within action in many 
material ways is premised on matters not in evidence. For 
example, it contains summaries of business records which are not 
in evidence and of which there is no foundation that he is 
custodian. See Exhibit "10". It assumes population figures for 
Salt Lake City based on heresay, without foundation or evidence 
before the Court. See Exhibit "8". It assumes building height 
and size based on heresay. See Exhibit "6". It assumes tax 
distributions without foundation and based on heresay. See 
Exhibit "4". 
2. The affidavit makes conclusions and expresses opinions 
and belief without foundation and beyond the field of the witness 
expertise. Defendants specifically object to the paragraphs and 
exhibits set forth in the attached summary of objections on the 
basis of hearsay and that affiant has no competence on the 
matters therein asserted and that there are insufficient facts 
upon which to base the conclusions, opinions and beliefs stated. 
3. The affidavit is irrelevant and immaterial to the 
matters at issue. 
Salt LaKe City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Objection to the Affidavit of Merrill R. Norman to 
Lon Rodney Kump, RICHARD, BIRD & KUMP, 323 East 400 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111; James M. Elegante, PARSONS, BEHLE & 
LATIMER, 185 South State Street, P.O. Box 11898, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84147; and to Dorothy C. Pleshe, GREEN, CALLISTER & NEBEKER, 
800 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133, by depositing 
same in the U.S. mail with postage prepaid thereon this day 
of March, 1983. 
TT 
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SUMMARY OF OBJECTIONS TO 
AFFIDAVIT OF MERRILL R. NORMAN 
Affidavit 
Paragraph 
5 
10 
11 
12 
Improper 
Allegation 
Nature of Airport funding 
Characterization and alleged necessity of 
alleged operations, nature and effect of 
Airport concession activities, and 
nature of Airport funding 
Benefit from Airport 
Tax discrimination 
Characterization of defendant's claims 
Affiant's lack of awareness of 
financing alternatives 
Airport cost sharing and tax 
discrimination 
Claims of E.L. Bud Willoughby 
Relative police benefits, police 
benefits to plaintiff, police 
computations, acre computations, 
police utilization computations 
Objection 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Irrelevant 
No foundation 
Irrelevant 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
Rule 
56 U.R.E. 
63 U.R.E. 
56 U.R.E. 
63 U.R.E. 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E, 
56 U.R.E 
63 U.R.E, 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E, 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E, 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E, 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E. 
9 
J 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Police Department expenditures, 
cost of service computations, taxes 
paid to general fund, relative Police 
Department expenditures, taxes paid for 
Police operation 
Payments by guests for police and security 
Relative per capita call rate 
Relative financial burdens 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E, 
Affidavit of Fire Chief 
Fire Department services and taxes, 
nature of hotels and motels, building 
heights and classifications, high-rise 
use and floor space, sources of tax 
revenues and tax effects 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E, 
56 U.R.E 
63 U.R.E, 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E, 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E, 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E, 
19 
20 
21 
Ambulance and paramedic services 
and financing 
Fire Department Expenditure allocations, 
general fund taxes and tax allocations, 
relative service and tax computations, and 
effects of innkeeper tax 
Tax comparisons and computations, tourist 
development benefits, effects of innkeeper 
tax 
Tax Law charges 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E, 
56 U.R.E, 
6 3 U.R.E, 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E, 
56 U.R.E, 
63 U.R.E, 
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23 Adoption and effect of tax law charges 
24 Impact on innkeeper tax 
25 Taxes and relative tax burdens 
Exhibits 1 - 1 1 Taxes, populations, expenditures and 
services; comparisons and computations 
No foundation 56 U.R.E, 
Hearsay 63 U.R.E, 
No foundation 56 U.R.E, 
Hearsay 63 U.R.E, 
No foundation 56 U.R.E, 
Hearsay 63 U.R.E, 
No foundation 56 U.R.E, 
Hearsay 63 U.R.E, 
APPENDIX X 
10-8-39 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
POWERS AND DUTIES OF ALL CITIES 10-8-39 
line Harding v Alpine City 656 P 2d 985 30 P 758 (1892) overruled on other grounds 
(Utah 1982) Cobia v Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375 366 P 2d 
City did not have authority to enact an ordi 986 (1961) 
nance requiring mandator} sewer connections This specific grant of power carries with it 
of all buildings located on property within 500 such power as is necessarily and fairly implied 
feet of an existing sewer line for the purpose of or incident thereto Bohn v Salt Lake Citv 79 
defraying sewer construction costs this section Utah 121 8 P 2d 591 81 ALR 215 (1932) 
limits citys authority to require mandatory 
sewer connections to those buildings located on S t f *e w a t e r PoUution control board. 
propertv within 300 feet of an existing sewer Maintenance of a sewage disposal system is 
line Harding v Alpine City, 656 P 2d 985 a proper function of a city and Utah Const Art 
... , 1Q82) ^ 29 prohibits state water pollution control 
board from applying rules interfering with the 
Scope of city's powers. internal sewer system of a city State Water 
A city has a wide discretion in acting under Pollution Control Bd v Salt Lake City 6 Utah 
this section Kiesel v Ogden City 8 Utah 237, 2d 247 311 P 2d 370 (1957) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am Jur 2d Municipal resident to pay for other unrelated services 60 
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political A L R 3d 714 
Subdivisions §§ 569 to 574 Validity and construction of regulation by 
C J S. — 63 C J S Municipal Corporations municipal corporation fixing sewer-use rates, 
§ 1049 61 A L R 3d 1236 
A.L.R. — Right of municipality to refuse Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations 
services provided by it to resident for failure of «®= 170 
10-8-39. License of certain businesses. 
They may license, tax and regulate hawking and peddling, pawnbrokers 
and loan agencies, employment agencies, auctioneers and auction houses, 
music halls, theaters, theatrical and other exhibitions, shows and amuse-
ments, the business conducted by ticket scalpers, distilleries and breweries, 
brokers, and keepers of public scales, stages and buses, sight-seeing and 
touring cars or vehicles, cabs and taxicabs, and solicitors therefor, bathhouses, 
swimming pools, skating rinks, smelters, crushers, sampling works and mills, 
hotels, and other public places, boardmghouses, restaurants, eating houses, 
lodgmghouses, laundries, barbershops and beauty shops, hackmen, draymen, 
and drivers of stages, buses, sight-seeing and touring cars, cabs and taxicabs 
and other public conveyances, porters, expressmen and draymen and all 
others pursuing like occupations, and prescribe their compensation, may li-
cense, tax and regulate secondhand and junk stores and forbid the owners or 
persons m charge of such stores from purchasing or receiving any articles 
whatsoever from minors without the written consent of their guardians or 
parents, may license tax and regulate storage houses and warehouses and 
require bond to the city for the benefit of bailors therein, may license, tax and 
regulate the business conducted by merchants, wholesalers and retailers, 
shopkeepers and storekeepers, automobile garages, service and filling sta-
tions, butchers, bakeries, laundries, druggists, photographers, assayers, 
confectioners, billboards, bill posting and the distribution or display of adver-
tising matter 
261 
10-8-39 CITIES AND TOWNS 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 206, 
s u b d . 38; L. 1911, ch. 120, § 1; 1915, ch. 100, 
§ 1; C.L. 1917, § 570x38; L. 1931, ch. 9, § 1; 
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-8-39. 
Compiler ' s Notes. — "They," as used at the 
beginning of this section, refers to boards of 
commissioners and city councils of cities. See 
§ 10-8-1. 
Cross-References. — Boxing contests, 
§ 11-5-1 et seq. 
Clubs allowing consumption of liquor on 
premises, § 11-10-1 et seq. 
ANALYSIS 
Barbershops. 
"Business" construed. 
Butchers. 
Hotels and rooming houses. 
Interstate commerce. 
Lawyers. 
Licensing in general. 
Merchants. 
Motor transport companies. 
Price advertising of eyeglasses. 
Restaurants and eating houses. 
Rules and regulations. 
Social clubs. 
—Restaurant activities. 
Taxicabs. 
Telephone instruments. 
Barbershops. 
Under this section, an ordinance fixing the 
hours of business for barbershops is invalid. 
Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 
P.2d 537 (1942). 
The rulemaking power given to cities in ref-
erence to barbershops does not mean any rule, 
but such rules reasonably related and designed 
to protect the health of the public. Salt Lake 
City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 P.2d 537 
(1942). 
"Business*' cons t rued . 
The term "business" denotes the employ-
ment or occupation in which a person is en-
gaged to procure a living. Morgan v. Salt Lake 
City, 78 Utah 403, 3 P.2d 510 (1931). 
Bu tche r s . 
A retail meat dealer is included within the 
word "butchers," and this section, together 
with §§ 10-8-43 and 10-8-80, justifies an ordi-
nance imposing a license upon such business. 
Provo City v. Provo Meat & Packing Co., 49 
Utah 528, 165 P. 477, 1918D Ann. Cas. 530 
(1917). 
Hotels and rooming houses. 
This section confers upon the board of com-
missioners and city council express authority 
Counties, licensing businesses for regulation 
and revenues, § 17-5-27. 
Employment offices, license required, 
§ 34-29-1 et seq. 
General grant of authority, § 10-8-80. 
Insurance companies, license or tax prohib-
ited, § 31-14-4(5). 
Pawnbrokers and secondhand dealers, 
§ 11-6-1 et seq. 
Power to fix terms and manner of issuance, 
§ 10-8-4. 
to regulate and license rooming houses and ho-
tels. The right to license includes the right to 
refuse a license for cause, and when it is re-
fused, the presumption is that it was for a good 
and sufficient cause. Larsen v. Salt Lake City, 
44 Utah 437, 141 P.98 (1914). 
Interstate commerce. 
Former provision requiring license to can-
vass or sell by sample certain goods shipped 
into state, but permitting the canvassing or 
selling without license of goods not shipped 
into state was void. State v. Bayer, 34 Utah 
257, 97 P. 129, 19 L.R.A. (n.s.) 297 (1908). 
Lawyers . 
Under former statute, cities had no power to 
exact a license fee from lawyers. Ogden City v. 
Boreman, 20 Utah 98, 57 P. 843 (1899). 
This section is not applicable to the business 
of practicing law, since the power of cities to 
tax, license and regulate, under this section, is 
limited to businesses listed therein. Davis v. 
Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616, 16 
A.L.R.2d 1208, rehearing denied, 118 Utah 
401, 223 P.2d 412 (1950). 
Licensing in general. 
It is believed that under this section the city 
councils and the boards of commissioners have 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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] a rge discretion as to the person to whom the 
license mav be granted and as to the place of 
Kuliness Perry v. Citv Council, 7 Utah 143, 25 
p 739. U L.R.A. 446 (1891). 
The power given by this section to "regulate" 
includes the power to license. Provo City v. 
Provo Meat & Packing Co., 49 Utah 528,165 P. 
477, 1918D Ann. Cas. 530 (1917). 
Merchants . 
City may impose a general merchant's li-
cense tax upon one who is engaged in a general 
merchandising business, including the sale of 
meats, and impose a further license tax upon 
such a business. Provo City v. Provo Meat & 
Packing Co., 49 Utah 528, "l65 P. 477, 1918D 
Ann. Cas. 530 (1917). 
Motor t r a n s p o r t companies . 
Under this section, cities are given power 
with respect to motor transport companies; 
there, however, is no power to grant or require 
franchises to use streets. Utah Light & Trac-
tion Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 101 Utah 99, 
118 P.2d 683 (1941). 
Pr ice adver t i s ing of eyeglasses. 
Ordinance prohibiting price advertising of 
eyeglasses does not have any basis of relation-
snip to public health and is therefore invalid. 
Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385,284 
P.2d 702 (1955). 
R e s t a u r a n t s a n d ea t ing houses . 
Cities have the power to pass reasonable or-
dinances regulating restaurants and eating 
houses. Ogden City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556,182 P. 
530, 5 A.L.R. 960 (1919). 
Ordinance prohibiting maintenance of 
booths of certain dimensions in restaurants so 
as to prevent persons of both sexes having no 
regard for law or good morals from meeting in 
such places was reasonable. Ogden City v. Leo, 
54 Utah 556, 182 P. 530, 5 A.L.R. 960 (1919). 
Neither this section nor Constitution of Utah 
authorizes municipalities to enact civil rights 
legislation and there is no common-law duty 
resting on tavern keeper to serve patrol, thus 
complaint seeking damages for defendant's re-
fusal to serve food to plaintiff "under either the 
common law or by statute or valid city ordi-
nance" stated no cause of action. Nance v. 
Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517, 150 
P.2d 773 (1944). 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Licenses and 
Permits <i 91 et seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal 
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political 
Subdivisions $ 471 et seq.; 58 Am. Jur. 2d Oc-
cupations, Trades, and Professions § 5. 
Rules and regula t ions . 
Where the power "to regulate" a particular 
calling or business is conferred on a city, it 
authorizes such city to prescribe and enforce 
all such proper and reasonable rules and regu-
lations as may be deemed necessary and 
wholesome in conducting the business in a 
proper and orderly manner. Salt Lake City v. 
Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 P.2d 537 (1942). 
The power to regulate business can mean 
only such regulations as are reasonably and 
substantially related to the safeguarding of the 
public health. Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 
Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955). 
Social clubs. 
—Res tauran t activities. 
This section's grant to cities of the power to 
license and regulate certain activities within 
its jurisdiction, including restaurants, is a gen-
eral grant of licensing and regulatory power 
over certain named activities, but by enacting 
additional statute giving cities the power to 
license and regulate social clubs, recreational 
associations, athletic associations and the like, 
legislature indicated it did not construe this 
section as containing such grant, so that city's 
authority for licensing and regulating the res-
taurant activities of social club must be found 
in latter statute. Salt Lake City v. Towne 
House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P.2d 
442 (1967). 
Taxicabs . 
This section permits a city council to require 
that taxicab operators providing service within 
the city to have a certificate of public conve-
nience and necessity, even though their pri-
mary areas of service are outside the city 
limits. Butt v. Salt Lake City Corp., 550 P.2d 
202 (Utah 1976). 
Telephone ins t rumen t s . 
Under Constitution, as it read originally, 
and former statutes, cities had the power to 
levy and collect, for revenue purposes, a rea-
sonable license fee for each telephone instru-
ment, operated and maintained by any person 
or corporation and used exclusively within the 
city limits for a local business and for which a 
rental or a charge was made. Ogden City v. 
Crossman. 17 Utah 66, 53 P. 985 (1898)". 
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations 
§§ 168. 229 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Application of city ordinance re-
quiring license tor laundry, to supplier of coin-
operated laundry machines intended for Uoe in 
apartment building, 65 A.L.R.3d 1296. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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Brokers suspension or revocation of real es-
tate broker s license on ground of discrimina-
tion 42 A L R 3d 1099 
Validity and construction of statute or ordi-
nance regulating or prohibiting self-service 
gasoline filling stations, 46 A L R 3d 1393 
Validity and construction of statute or ordi-
nances forbidding treatment in health clubs or 
massage salons bv persons of the opposite sex, 
51 A L R 3 d 936 
Validity of municipal ordinances regulating 
time during which restaurant business ma> be 
conducted 53 A L R 3d 942 
Vahdit\ of state or local regulation dealing 
with resale of tickets to theatrical or sporting 
events 81 A L R 3d 655 
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations 
«=> 621 
10-8-40. Resorts and amusements. 
They may license, tax, regulate and suppress billiard, pool, bagatelle, pi-
geonhole or any other tables or implements kept or used for similar purpose; 
also pm alleys or tables, or ball alleys; may also license, tax, regulate, prohibit 
or suppress dancing halls, dancing resorts, dancing pavilions, and all places or 
resorts to which persons of opposite sexes may resort for the purpose of danc-
ing or indulging m any other social amusements. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 206, 
subd. 39; L. 1911, ch. 120, § 1; 1915, ch. 100, 
§ 1; C.L. 1917, § 570x39; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
15-8-40. 
Compiler's Notes. — "They," as used at the 
beginning of this section, refers to boards of 
commissioners and city councils of cities See 
§ 10-8-1 
Cross-References. — Boxing contests and 
wrestling matches, §§ 11-5-1, 11-5-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Bagatelle, pinball, and marble machines. 
Billiards and pool. 
Card games. 
Bagatelle, pinball, and marble machines. 
The words "suppress" and "prohibit" as used 
in this section are not synonymous, thus, a city 
ordinance prohibiting the use for any purpose 
of bagatelle, pinball, and marble machines is 
not authorized, since under this section the cit-
ies have only the right to restrict in a reason-
able manner the use of these machines Ste-
venson \ Salt Lake City Corp , 7 Utah 2d 28, 
317 P 2 d 597 (1957) 
Billiards and pool. 
This section, when read in connection with 
§§ 10-8-81 and 10-8-84, confers power with ref-
erence to billiard and pool tables, but does not 
extend beyond the regulation or suppression of 
keeping them, and § 10-8-81 does not go far-
ther than the regulation of clubs Accordingly, 
an ordinance prohibiting any person from play-
ing at billiards upon any billiard or pool table 
in any clubroom is invalid, for such power is 
neither expressly granted nor necessarily im-
plied or incident to any express grant Ameri-
can Fork City v Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P 
249 (1930) 
Card games. 
This section, even when construed with 
§§ 10-8-39 and 10-8-80, does not authorize a 
citv to levy a license tax upon one maintaining 
a room open to the public in which card games 
are plaved Morgan \ Salt Lake Cit), 78 Utah 
403, 3 P 2 d 510 (1931) 
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